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THE CRISIS: POLICY LESSONS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Throughout the 2000s, mainstream economists concurred on an ‘augmented Washington 
consensus’ which was deemed favorable to rapid, stable, non-inflationary growth:  light-touch 
regulation, limited government intervention, rules-based fiscal and monetary policies. The 
financial crisis that erupted in the summer of 2007 and turned into a sharp, global economic 
downturn in the autumn of 2008 led policymakers into transgression. Not only did they 
engage on unprecedented scale in discretionary monetary and fiscal stimulus, but they also 
intervened heavy-handedly by bailing out banks and some non-financial industries. 
The present paper reviews the main causes of the crisis, recalls how governments around the 
world had to depart from established policy stances, and reflects on the legacy of the crisis 
both in terms of future challenges and changes in policy doctrine. 
There are three different, non-mutually exclusive lines of explanation to the crisis:  wrong 
incentives in the financial sector, unsustainable macroeconomic outcomes, and misunderstood 
and mismanaged systemic complexity. These yield different sets of policy recommendations, 
all of which combine the overhaul of financial regulation, supervisory reform, changes in the 
monetary policy framework, and some of which also involve reforming the international 
monetary system and rethinking the remit and governance of international organizations. The 
G-20, relying on specialized international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the Financial Stability Board, as well as on national and regional authorities, has addressed 
many of these. Crucial themes, however, have been left unaddressed, both on the regulatory 
and the macro-financial fronts: 
-  on the regulatory front, four issues stand out unresolved: (i) moral hazard, which was 
magnified when G-7 finance ministers decided not to let financial institutions of systemic 
significance collapse; (ii) the separation between retail and investment banking; (iii) the 
desirable size of the financial sector, both in terms of efficient resource allocation and in 
face of the ‘too big to be saved’ dilemma; and (iv) the impact of new capital regulations 
on the cost of capital, which may hamper post-crisis growth; 
-  on the macro-financial front, the crisis has been a reminder that economic policy is not 
only about targets and rules but also about risk-management, both in the private and in the 
public sector. On the monetary side, the crisis has questioned the relevance for central 
banks to target consumer-price inflation and leave aside asset prices, and more generally 
financial stability. As concerns international coordination, there is no agreement yet as to 
how much current-account imbalances contributed to financial instability. Historical 
experience with peer-pressure-based surveillance, including in Europe, allows for low 
expectations on the newly-created G-20 framework for sustainable growth.  5
ABSTRACT 
We review the competing explanations of the 2007-2008 global crisis, recall how 
governments around the world had to depart from established policy stances, and reflect on 
the legacy of the crisis both in terms of future challenges and changes in policy doctrine. The 
G-20 has addressed important regulatory and macro-financial dimensions of the crisis, but it 
has left difficult questions unanswered. We review some of these incoming challenges such as 
moral hazard in the post-bail-out world, the trade-off between financial stability and the cost 
of capital, the feasibility for central banks to manage their new financial stability mandate, 
and the effectiveness of peer review to address global imbalances. 
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THE CRISIS: POLICY LESSONS AND POLICY CHALLENGES
* 
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Benoît Cœuré, Pierre Jacquet and Jean-Pisani-Ferry 
INTRODUCTION 
As long as the global economy was growing at a rapid, stable and non-inflationary pace, 
whether this ‘great moderation’ was a result of prudent, predictable macroeconomic policies, 
or merely of luck, was a matter of debate among academics.
1 Some form of consensus had 
however emerged which resulted in a set of policies which were deemed favorable to growth 
and stability (the ‘augmented Washington consensus’) and which emphasized the benefits of 
rule-based policies and the need to eschew discretionary activism. It was also agreed, and 
enshrined in international agreements, that any significant government assistance to private 
firms operating on competitive markets was to be regarded with considerable suspicion. 
The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 and moved into a sharp, global 
economic crisis in the autumn of 2008 – which we shall address in short here as ‘the crisis’ – 
suddenly led policymakers to break with the prevailing consensus. Not only did governments 
and central banks embark upon discretionary monetary and fiscal stimulus, but they also 
intervened heavily by bailing out banks and by assisting non-financial industries (especially 
the car industry).  
The main reason why policymakers made this choice was probably that the memory of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s had not been lost. Even before it became clear that the fall in 
stock prices, output, and international trade was initially as fast as during the Great 
Depression, if not faster (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009), policymakers decided to make 
full use of monetary and fiscal instruments to tackle the crisis. After the US investment bank 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008 – with dire consequences for market 
conditions - they also put the free-market motto aside and embarked on wholesale bank 
support.  
As a result the crisis gave rise to what the heads of state of the G-20 called “the largest and 
most coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus ever undertaken”.
2  
Financial crises are not exceptional events (see the historical record reported by Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009a,b) but truly global crises are. This one immediately triggered a series of 
debates.  
                                                 
*   Concluding chapter of our forthcoming book, Economic Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford University 
Press 2010. We are grateful to Elie Cohen, Anne Epaulard, Martin Kessler, Jean-Pierre Landau, André Sapir, Paul 
Seabright, Nicolas Véron and Charles Wyplosz, who helped us improve a lot the quality of this paper, and to Andrew 
Fielding for editorial support. 
1   See especially Romer (1999) and Blanchard and Simon (2001). 
2   According to the declaration of the September 2009 G-20 summit of Pittsburgh.    7
The first debate has been about the causes of the crisis. It started early but is unlikely to be 
settled soon. On-the-spot analyses are often partial and overly influenced by particular aspects 
of the chain of events. It took decades to clarify why the Great Depression occurred:  it was 
only in 1963, with the publication of Milton Friedman’s seminal book with Anna Schwartz, A 
Monetary History of the United States, that the responsibility of monetary policy was 
highlighted, and it was in the 1980s – half a century after the facts - that Ben Bernanke 
brought new light to the debate with his research on the role of the credit channel. But like in 
the 1930s, action had to be taken and was taken without delay, on the basis of the available 
evidence and the immediate reading of the factors behind the crisis. This amounted to curing 
the symptoms, not the causes of the crisis.  
The second debate has been about the policy response. Again, it started early, and was 
unsurprisingly controversial. Age-old discussions on the effectiveness of fiscal policy were 
revived and at a deeper level of questioning, citizens and politicians (more than economists) 
have started discussing whether the high cost of the crisis called for a fundamental rethink of 
the economic system.  
The third debate was best captured by the Queen of England when she famously asked during 
a visit to the London School of Economics “why did no one see it coming”. It has mostly 
developed among economists and has centered on the profession’s potential responsibility for 
not having pointed out adequately that financial developments in the 2000s involved 
significant risks. 
This paper focuses on the first two debates and hints at the third one. It does not attempt to 
provide a unified, empirically grounded analysis leading to unambiguous prescriptions. More 
modestly, we outline what we think we have learned this far, what are the policy issues raised 
by the response to the crisis, and which are the longer-term priorities for reform. 
1.  WHAT WENT WRONG? 
1.1.  A brief account of the crisis 
The crisis started in a small and relatively obscure corner of the US mortgage credit market – 
the now world-famous subprime market. Subprime mortgages are financial products that aim 
to give access to home ownership to poorer and therefore less creditworthy households. These 
high-yield mortgages are riskier, and contracts were designed so as to mitigate this risk thanks 
to rising house prices:  low-income borrowers could finance and refinance their homes by 
collateralizing them. This worked as long as house prices were rising, but in 2006 default 
rates started to ratchet up in response to the decline in house prices.  
This would have remained the lenders’ problem, had subprime credits not been securitized, 
i.e. transformed into marketable bonds (see Box 1 for a description of securitization). 
Furthermore, they had also been pooled with other types of mortgage-based securities to form 
structured assets that were therefore riskier, and had a higher return in comparison to standard 
fixed-income instruments. Complex and opaque packaging of this sort was commonplace, 
which explains why defaults on the subprime segments affected the whole range of asset-
backed securities. As default rates exceeded what had been considered as probable, investors 
shied away from financial products previously considered as safe, and their price therefore  8
went down. The more complex a product was, the more difficult it became to value it. Asset 
holders became unable to value their ‘toxic’ products, let alone sell them.  
Banks in the United States and in Europe had not only invested in these assets which had 
turned out to be riskier than first thought. They had done so by issuing debt rather than by 
investing their own capital, largely through legally distinct subsidiaries (the so-called conduits 
and special investment vehicles or SIVs) that used the income stream from their assets to 
service their debt. Being squeezed between losses on asset-backed securities on the one hand, 
and (as their losses started being known) an increasing difficulty to roll-over their debts on the 
other hand, these so-called ‘shadow banks’ (see below) had no choice but to draw on the 
credit lines they had with their parent banks. The latter then had either to extend credit to their 
subsidiaries or to repatriate them onto their balance sheets, and to seek a way to refinance 
them. But in 2007 this happened to be increasingly difficult because of rising mutual 
suspicion on the interbank market.  
In August 2007, the usually highly liquid interbank market suddenly froze. Europe was 
affected as much as the US, because a large part of the so-called toxic assets had been bought 
by European banks. Central banks instantly stepped in and started to play their role of lender 
of last resort, providing liquidity directly to financial institutions (against collateral) in order 
to help them face debt repayment schedules. But liquidity was not enough. Market 
participants were not willing to lend to potentially bankrupt counterparties. Losses were 
meanwhile compounded as banks started to sell assets for which there was still a market – 
frequently stocks - to reap liquidity and comply with capital ratios. The resulting fall in asset 
prices in turn further damaged the banks’ balance sheets as they are based on the market 
values of assets (this is known as mark-to-market accounting) and the fall in assets prices 
forced banks to sell further assets. Furthermore, many complex assets they had purchased 
were no longer being traded and published accounts therefore did not provide accurate 
information on the true extent of the damage. As a result, some banks were proved, or 
suspected, to be insolvent, which exacerbated mistrust in the interbank market. The demise of 
Northern Rock, a UK building society which asked for liquidity support from the Bank of 
England in September 2007 and was subsequently taken into state ownership, illustrated the 
consequences of the liquidity crisis. 
The panic reached a climax in September-October 2008 in the wake of incoherent responses 
by US authorities – investment bank Bear Sterns and insurer AIG were bailed out, but 
Lehman Brothers, another investment bank, had to default - and the precipitated bail-out of 
Dexia and Fortis, two major European banks with complex cross-border operations. There 
was a massive loss of confidence. Everybody hoarded liquidity and central banks had to cut 
interest rates to zero and engage in a near-total substitution of the interbank market. At this 
stage contagion to the real economy amplified as the fall in equity and the freeze of corporate 
bond markets reduced the ability of large companies to finance their investments. Banks had 
also become reluctant to lend to non-financial customers since this would have raised their 
exposure to risk whereas they wanted to reduce it. This especially affected small and medium-
size companies that are dependent on bank credit. 
Banks also reduced their exposure to emerging and developing markets, through credit 
rationing by their local subsidiaries (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) and more 
generally a ‘sudden stop’ in capital outflows. This was a crucial channel of crisis contagion to  9
those emerging economies that relied on external financing. Other channels materialized 
through the real economy: cuts in investment plans, together with the reduction in inventories, 
dramatically reduced world trade. This especially affected East-Asian countries whose growth 
models were based on export demand from the US and Europe, rather than on domestic or 
regional demand. The fall in previously inflated commodity prices also affected several 
emerging and developing countries. More generally, contracting demand in developed 
economies dragged the whole world into a recession, including low-income countries. 
Governments at this stage responded to the crisis with full force instead of delegating its 
management to central banks. The US and Europe put in place bank rescue and guarantee 
plans amounting to about one-fourth of GDP. In an attempt to prevent further collapses they 
bailed out or nationalized insolvent banks, recapitalized the weak ones and provided credit 
guarantees to all. Major budgetary stimulus plans followed soon, while central banks engaged 
in non-conventional easing measures. The IMF, the World Bank, regional development banks 
and other donor institutions were also mobilized to counter capital outflows from emerging 
economies, finance international trade and help developing economies engineer 
countercyclical policies. This was not enough to prevent a world recession, but after a sharp 
fall of production in winter 2008-2009 stabilization occurred in spring 2009.  
These various steps of crisis contagion are summarized in Table 1.  10
Table 1 - Main stages in financial crisis development 
Date Events  Policy  responses 
2006-Summer 
2007 
Localized credit concerns in the US  
•  Rising defaults in riskier housing mortgages 
•  Falling prices of lower credit tiers of some credit 
securities 
 
Summer-Autumn 
2007 
Initial cracks in confidence and liquidity strains 
•  Interbank rates rise sharply. Funding of asset-backed 
securities dries up 
•  Failure of two large hedge funds 
•  Run on British bank Northern Rock 
•  Central banks extend liquidity to 
banks through exceptional 
tenders 
•  Rescue of Northern Rock 
Autumn 2007-  
early Summer 
2008  
Accumulation of losses and continuation of liquidity strains 
•  Severe mark-to-market losses in trading books  
•  Collapse of commercial paper market 
•  Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) brought back on 
bank balance sheets 
•  Worries about liquidity of major financial institutions 
•  Continued liquidity support by 
central banks 
•  US government bails out 
investment bank Bear Stearns 
and sells it to JP Morgan 
Summer 2008  Intensification of losses and liquidity strains 
•  Mark-to-market losses and liquidity strains escalate 
•  US agencies Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac insolvent 
•  Funding problems of UK mortgage banks intensify 
•  Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac de 
facto nationalized in early 
September 
 
September 2008  Massive loss of confidence 
•  Bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers  
•  Loss of confidence that major institutions are too big to 
fail 
•  Bankruptcy of Washington Mutual in the US, Bradford 
and Bingley in the UK, Icelandic banks  
•  Almost total seizure of interbank money markets and 
short-term funding markets 
•  Rescue of European banks Dexia and Fortis 
•  US government refuses to bail 
out investment bank Lehman 
Brothers. Lehman files for 
bankruptcy protection. 
•  US government bail-out of 
insurer AIG 
 
October 2008    •  Widening of collateral range and 
wholesale liquidity support by 
central banks 
•  Governments assist banks 
through capital injections and 
funding guarantees  
•  Explicit commitment that 
systemic banks will not be 
allowed to fail 
•  Central banks’ refinancing rates 
brought to zero or close to zero 
Autumn 2008 - 
Spring 2009 
Crisis transmitted to real economy 
•  Sharp decline in industrial production and GDP 
•  Series of financial crises in emerging Europe as capital 
flows suddenly stop 
•  Collapse of world trade  
•  Slow normalization of interbank markets 
•  Central banks turn to 
unconventional policies 
•  Large-scale government stimulus 
•  International coordination of 
crisis responses 
•  International swap agreements 
•  IMF-led assistance programs 
Source:  Adapted and updated from Financial Services Authority (2009).  11
1.2.  Three questions on the crisis 
These developments raise three major questions:  Why did the crisis occur? Why did it engulf 
the entire financial system? Why have its economic consequences been so severe? 
The third question is the easiest to answer. Financial crises affect the real economy through 
credit supply constraints (this is the credit channel), wealth effects (the drop in asset prices 
reduces household wealth and diminishes consumption, while companies incur losses on their 
balance sheets and reduce investment accordingly) and, last but not least, confidence effects. 
A robust stylized fact emerging from a series of financial crises in recent decades is that they 
result in sharp and more or less prolonged drops in output (Cerra and Saxena, 2007; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009a,b).  
In 2008-2009 international dimensions added to the shock and compounded its effects. In a 
sense, this was the first global crisis since the end of the previous wave of globalization, in the 
1930s. Although there are questions for research on the relative importance of the 
transmission channels and the magnitude of the corresponding effects, once the financial 
system had reached near-paralysis a sharp drop in global output had to be expected and initial 
hopes for a decoupling of emerging economies were soon rebuffed.
3 
The first and second questions – why a financial crisis, and why so widespread - are much 
more challenging. Part of the explanation can be found in financial conditions that prevailed 
in 2007, especially a high appetite for yield and a pervasive mispricing of risk, which had led 
many private financial agents to enter on a massive scale into debt-financed (or leveraged, see 
below) investments in risky assets. Once liquidity dried up and risk was re-priced, the same 
firms whose aim had been to maximize return through leverage entered into a precipitated and 
disorderly process of deleveraging. Another part of the explanation has to do with the rise of 
the shadow banking system. Banks had created special vehicles to outsource and refinance 
long-term assets by raising short-term money from financial markets. Such vehicles were 
located outside of the banks’ balance sheets and were therefore not subject to banking 
regulation and particularly to capital requirements. They were nevertheless controlled by the 
parent bank, which extended liquidity lines which could be triggered in case of refinancing 
difficulty. When these vehicles found themselves in trouble, banks had at the same time to 
repatriate them onto their balance sheets and to digest the corresponding losses, which 
suddenly put them at odds with regulatory capital adequacy ratios. Part of the explanation also 
has to do with the complexity and connectedness of the global financial architecture:  the 
system looked able to absorb and diffuse shocks, and it had performed very well when facing 
a sectoral shock on the occasion of the ‘dotcom’ crash, but in 2007-2008 it turned out to 
amplify and reverberate, rather than diffuse the shock arising from the subprime crisis. Part, 
finally, results from the banks selling their remaining liquid assets, stocks, thereby 
transferring the crisis to the stock market and reducing the value of the remaining stock on 
their balance sheet.   
                                                 
3   Much hinges of course on what ‘decoupling’ is supposed to mean. Clearly, the crisis has demonstrated 
that emerging markets were importantly affected by the implications of the shock originating in the US. 
However, it became apparent in the first half of 2009 that big emerging countries would emerge from the slump 
earlier and faster than the US or Europe.   12
In order to clarify the role of these factors in the genesis and the development of the crisis, 
and the actions taken by policy-makers, it is best to start from the root factors that contributed 
to them. 
1.3.  A taxonomy of crisis theories 
It is useful to start from a simple taxonomy of crisis theories (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 - A simple taxonomy of crisis theories 
 
There are three, non-mutually exclusive approaches: 
  A first strand of analysis emphasizes the microeconomic roots of financial imprudence. 
According to this approach excessive risk-taking and leveraging  (i.e. debt-financed 
financial investment) on the part of financial players were rooted in inadequate incentives 
that in turn can be ascribed either to insufficient or, on the contrary, to inappropriate 
regulation. This approach points to financial and accounting regulatory reform as the main 
structural response. There are, however, diverse views on what the regulatory agenda 
should be. The debate can also take on a moral dimension as greed is regarded by public 
opinion as having been at the heart of financial excesses. 
  A second approach claims that the macroeconomic environment contributed to excessive 
leveraging and risk-taking. Two main factors contributed to such a lax environment. First, 
the US and global monetary policy stances have been criticized as excessively 
expansionary, which favored extensive leverage and the mispricing of financial and real- 
estate assets. Second, the flow of foreign savings into the US (which had global current- 
account imbalances as its counterpart) resulted in a low level of long-term interest rates. 
For the supporters of this view, the underlying macro factors need to be addressed if 
future crises are to be avoided. 
  Finally, a third view is inspired by engineering and ecology. It posits that the problem did 
not lie so much with either specific micro deficiencies or macro factors, but rather with 
the resilience of the financial system as a whole. Instead of putting emphasis on  13
fundamental causes, it sees the financial turmoil as a very low-probability event (a ‘black 
swan’) in which a shock of limited magnitude set in motion a chain-reaction that 
eventually resulted in a near-collapse. The policy implication is that the emphasis should 
be put on strengthening the robustness of the financial system as a whole. 
1.4.  Micro roots 
By far the most popular explanation of the crisis was that it was due to irresponsibility and to 
“reckless greed and risk-taking,” as expressed by President-elect Obama in January 2009. 
Popular representations combine imprudence, voracity, felony and corruption to depict what 
could be called a series of behaviors à la Bernard Madoff. However, unchecked greed was 
already pervasive in the 1980s and the 1990s while the financial system and the global 
economy prospered:  neither junk bonds nor the Enron fraud triggered a world crisis.  
Scholars of economic policy must avoid a repetition of the error made at the time of the Asian 
crisis by those who blamed ‘crony capitalism’ without questioning why cronyism, which had 
been there all along East Asia’s path to prosperity, had suddenly become a problem.
4 And 
there is a thin line between ‘reckless greed’ and self-interest, which economists have 
considered as the engine of decentralized economies since Adam Smith’s famous remark that:  
“it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity 
but to their self-love.” Sixty years earlier, Bernard de Mandeville had argued that private 
vices were at the root of prosperity.
5  
A more interesting question is what led private-market participants to undervalue or misprice 
financial risk both on the sell-side and on the buy-side, and why an already burdensome 
public regulation and supervision apparatus did not tackle the problem. Since the crisis broke 
out, major deficiencies in what had become standard financial practice have been highlighted 
by observers. Many are important, raise puzzling questions, and call for significant regulatory 
reform. Four stand out: compensation practices, securitization, leverage, and market 
valuation. 
 
                                                 
4   Paul Krugman (1998a) was an early advocate of the ‘cronyism’ interpretation, in support of a widely 
shared view within the International Monetary Fund, before changing his mind about the causes of the Asian 
crisis (Krugman, 1998b) 
5   Adam Smith (1776, 1977); Mandeville (1714).  14
a.  Compensation practices 
The traders’ hefty bonuses have been repeatedly resented by outraged citizens and they have 
become in some countries the symbol of the pre-crisis excesses. Beyond legitimate 
distributional concerns, the compensation structure impacts on incentives for risk-taking. In 
order to attract and retain talent, firms in the early 2000s routinely rewarded executives and 
traders on the basis of short-term performance. Executives generally received equity 
incentives in the form of options and shares without cash-out restrictions, and traders received 
bonuses tied to their annual performance. Also, a standard practice in banking was to reward 
executives with shares or options in a bank’s parent holding company. Because the limited 
liability of shareholders restricted their potential losses to the value of their capital, managers 
had a strong interest in taking on leverage in order to maximize expected gains.
6 For all, 
compensation structures acted as a powerful incentive to take risk. 
This issue is at its core one of corporate governance. Setting compensation is the role of a 
company board’s compensation committee, which is expected to act in the interest of the 
holders of capital. But, as demonstrated in the crisis, the failure of a large bank or financial 
company involves systemic risk, which in turn compels public authorities to intervene to 
prevent it. This without doubt entails moral hazard and results in distorted incentives. 
b.  Securitization 
Most economists consider that financial innovation is favorable to long-term growth and that 
securitization is a case in point. The packaging of a series of loan portfolios into a single 
product and the tranching of this product into securities of different qualities of risk can be 
regarded as positive innovation: the former because it reduces dependence on specific 
portfolio risk and the latter because it allows investors to diversify and choose the desired 
combination of risk and return.
7  
Box 1. A primer on securitization 
Securitization, the technique through which bank loans are transformed into marketable securities, was invented 
in the 1970s when US-government-sponsored agencies like Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage 
Association) started securitizing residential mortgages. Previously, banks held loans until they matured or were 
paid off (the so-called originate and hold model). But after World War II, depository institutions simply could 
not keep pace with the rising demand for housing credit and sought ways of increasing the sources of mortgage 
funding. To attract investors, an investment vehicle was developed that isolated mortgage pools, sorted them by 
order of credit quality and sold them as tranches, allowing banks to reduce their exposure to credit risk and 
thereby to increase their volume of credit. This is the so-called originate-and-distribute model. 
Securitization implies the pooling of various claims (such as mortgages, loans, bonds, trade and credit-card 
receivables, etc.) and their use as collateral to issue a prioritized capital structure of claims (the tranches).
8 This 
process results in a series of rated securities. The highest tranches are senior to the lower ones, so that they can 
achieve a good risk rating even though the underlying collateral includes high-risk mortgages. The lower 
tranches are high-yield ones to compensate for the higher risk.  
                                                 
6   See the research by Lucian Bebchuk and colleagues, for example Bebchuk (2009).   
7   For a discussion see Hellwig (2008).  
8   For a full description and discussion, see Coval et al. (2009)  15
The best known such asset-backed securities (ABS) include mortgage-based securities (MBS, collateralized by 
the service of mortgage loans), collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO, emanating from a further 
securitization of MBS), and the now-famous collateralized debt obligations (CDOs, resulting from the 
securitization of various ABS). Often, various credit-enhancement mechanisms are added to these products, such 
as credit default swaps (CDS) and various derivatives. Also, CDOs were in turn sliced into tranches and sold to 
vehicles themselves financed by debt – thereby forming what was known as ‘CDO square’ or CDO
2. 
Securitization was enormously successful:  in the US, the amount outstanding of corresponding asset-backed 
securities (ABS) reached 2.5 trillion dollars in 2007 (almost 20% of US GDP) and gave rise to further 
developments as simple securitized credits were restructured and repackaged into more complex ones. 
 
But sophisticated securitization had two consequences. First, it resulted in a major increase in 
the complexity of financial products that made risk difficult to assess. The first generation of 
structured products such as CDOs was admittedly rather simple since their purpose was only 
to sort a bundle of loans into a series of tranches of increasing risk and expected return so as 
to match investors’ different preferences for risk and return. But even sophisticated investors 
had difficulty assessing and therefore monitoring the risk embedded in more complex 
products such as CDO-square (Box 1), for two reasons:  details on the underlying risks were 
often not available, and even when they were, the value of the CDO was a complex, highly 
non-linear function of the distribution of the underlying risks. Scrutiny of risk was widely 
outsourced to credit-rating agencies and more often than not replaced by a blind and 
ultimately lethal faith in the robustness of market mechanisms. As Buiter (2009) has noted, 
risk transferred through securitization ended up with the investors most willing to hold it, but 
not necessarily the most able to bear it. 
The second consequence of securitization was that the credit originators – the lending 
institutions at the origin of the mortgage – had weak incentives to assess the credit risk. To the 
extent they were able to package and sell an entire credit portfolio, their incentive was limited 
to making sure that credit quality as assessed at the time of the sale matched the standards 
required by regulators and credit-rating agencies to qualify for a given risk category. The 
originate-and-distribute model of credit therefore involved moral hazard. Unsurprisingly, over 
the period following the sale of their loan, loans sold in the secondary market underperformed 
bank loans by a significant margin on a risk-adjusted basis (Berndt and Gupta, 2009). 
Securitization therefore contributed not only to disseminating risk, but also to sourcing new 
risk.  
Additionally, the pooling of various loans in a single product was an efficient way to diversify 
individual risks but it did not allow diversification of the macroeconomic risk related to the 
housing bubble. When house prices started falling, a large number of borrowers were 
simultaneously unable to repay their debt. This rise in the correlation of individual default 
rates was not correctly taken into account in the models used by securitizers. The CDO 
tranches rated ‘AAA’, the highest possible score, although they were deemed diversified 
enough to be robust, became vulnerable, triggering a loss of confidence and a contagion 
effect.
9  
                                                 
9   See  Coval  et al. (2009) for a discussion of the role of correlations. The authors notably show that the 
high credit rating of many securities pointed to rating agencies being extraordinarily confident about their ability 
to measure the underlying default risks and default correlations. Through the issuance of a capital structure,  16
A key question, though, is why rational investors nevertheless bought securitized debt. Gorton 
(2009) provides an interesting hypothesis.
10 He points out that the essence of banking is the 
provision of liquidity through producing what he calls ‘informationally-insensitive debt’:   
thanks to deposit insurance, which prevents bank runs, demand deposits are regarded as good 
as central bank money and no one can derive any profit from the production of private 
information about them. He then argues that securitization was a way to create ‘relatively 
informationally-insensitive debt’ without insurance: the higher-rated tranches served this 
purpose, until a systemic shock transformed informationally-insensitive into informationally 
sensitive debt prone to a run. Yet investors were accustomed to not bothering about 
information and they did not know how to produce it when it became needed, and the market 
for this debt collapsed.  
c.  Leverage 
Leverage is a very old technique that makes it possible to increase the return on capital by 
incurring debt. Suppose an investor invests his or her capital K in a (risky) asset of expected 
yield r. The return s/he can expect to earn per unit of capital is then simply r. But if instead 
s/he borrows D at rate i and invests A = K + D in the risky asset, s/he can expect to earn: 
         ( 1 )  
where l = D/K is the leverage ratio. When i<r, leverage thus appears as a simple way to 
increase return. Things are different when r turns out to be less than the cost of borrowing. 
And, worse, if the investor actually incurs a loss of z% on its investment, this implies a capital 
loss of z% without leverage but of (1+l)z% with leverage (and a total negative rate of return 
of - [z+(z+i)l]. The loss can exceed the investor’s capital, which means s/he is unable to repay 
the debt and is therefore bankrupt.  
Applied to banks, this simple mechanism has important consequences (Adrian and Shin, 
2008). Even in the absence of a true bankruptcy, the very fact that a bank’s assets have lost 
value implies a sudden rise in the leverage ratio, which is likely to lead the bank to sell off 
assets or restrict credit in order to deleverage. Suppose, for example, that initially A = 100, D 
= 90 and K = 10 (implying l = 9). Then a 5% decline in the value of A implies a 50% decline 
in the value of K and thus a doubling of the leverage ratio. Bringing it back to its previous 
value of 9 implies a considerable shrinking of the balance sheet. 
What this elementary calculation illustrates is the simple fact that leverage increases the 
expected return on capital but has two consequences:  first, it also increases the risk of 
bankruptcy; second, it leads banks to respond pro-cyclically to fluctuations in the value of 
their assets, thereby amplifying financial and economic fluctuations (Box 2). 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
small errors in evaluating the risk of underlying securities can translate into substantial variation in the default 
risk of the final structured product.  
10   Gorton (2008b) also questions the relevance of an explanation based on the ‘originate and distribute’ 
view, according to which risks were passed along to investors, thus lessening incentives to care about risk. He 
argues that risks remained involved all along the chain from originators to underwriters and that the interests of 
the various parties were aligned in securitization.  17
 
Box 2 – Leverage and pro-cyclicality 
Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin (2008) have used micro-data to demonstrate the pro-cyclicality of leverage 
in financial firms.  Financial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets actively to changes in their net worth. 
Adrian and Shin first observe that for a passive investor, the relationship between the value of assets A and the 
leverage ratio l is downward-sloping:  leverage falls when the value of total assets rises. This is simply because if 
debt D is held constant, l and A are negatively related: 
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Data indicate that households follow this type of behavior as the relationship between asset growth and leverage 
growth is negative (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 – Relationship between asset growth and leverage growth, US households, 1963-2006 
 
Source:  Adrian and Shin (2008, figure 2.2). 
 
This downward-sloping relationship gets lost for nonfinancial corporations. For commercial banks it becomes 
vertical at a zero-leverage growth intercept (Figure 2.2):  commercial banks thus tend to keep leverage constant. 
This implies that credit is likely to be pro-cyclical:  holding l constant means that the growth rate of debt D is the 
same as that of assets A.  18
Figure 2.2 – Relationship between asset growth and leverage growth, US commercial banks, 1963-2006 
 
Source:  Adrian and Shin (2008). 
 
The relationship is even reversed and turns positive for securities brokers and dealers (a statistical category that 
included the investment banks) (Figure 2.3), indicating strong leverage pro-cyclicality:  the higher the growth of 
total assets, the faster the growth of debt and of the leverage ratio l.  In other words, investment banks tended to 
accelerate borrowing when market conditions were improving. This is what led Lehman Brothers to excessive 
leveraged exposure to risky assets. 
Figure 2.3 – Relationship between asset growth and leverage growth, US securities brokers and dealers, 
1963-2006 
 
Source:  Adrian and Shin (2008). 
 
The pro-cyclicality of leverage in turn results from the counter-cyclical behavior of measured risk (low during 
booms and high during busts). Adrian and Shin (2008) conjecture that banks maintain a stock of capital K 
proportional to total Value-at-Risk (K = λ x VaR). Using the same notation as previously, the leverage ratio l can 
be written as: 
  ⎠
⎞ A
K
K A
       ( 2 . 2 )  
The leverage ratio l is therefore negatively related to unit Value-at-Risk, VaR/A. Adrian and Shin’s data confirm 
the counter-cyclicality of unit Value-at-Risk, which implies the pro-cyclicality of leverage. The interpretation is 
the following:  when asset prices increase, financial intermediaries’ balance sheets tend to get stronger, creating 
an incipient situation of surplus capital. The incentive is for intermediaries to find ways to employ this surplus 
capital through an expansion of balance sheets and an increase in leverage.   19
Given that large European banks in 2007 had leverage ratios comprised between 20 in the UK 
and 35 in Switzerland,
11 these mechanisms played a major role in the transmission of the crisis 
from asset prices to bank behavior. 
As bank failures may involve massive externalities, leverage has to be regulated in order to 
limit excessive risk-taking. Thus an important question is why existing regulation failed. Part 
of the answer is to be found in the role of the shadow banking system (Adrian and Shin, 
2009). By mid-2007, just before the crisis erupted, market-based assets amounted to more 
than 16 trillion US dollars, while bank-based assets were less than 13 trillion. Against this 
background, existing banking regulation proved insufficient. It mainly rested on two 
instruments: mandatory capital adequacy ratios and leverage ratios. 
Mandatory capital-adequacy ratios limit the size of a bank’s risk-weighted asset portfolio 
relative to its capital. They are at the heart of the Basle I and Basle II accords (Box 3) which 
have been implemented in most OECD countries and many East-Asian countries, but not in 
the US. Capital adequacy ratios proved to be both too low and unevenly enforced: 
  In the US, neither hedge funds nor investment banks had to comply with capital-adequacy 
ratios (only bank holding companies had to), whatever the potential (or, in the case of 
Lehman, actual) repercussions of their bankruptcy; 
  Most importantly, the sophisticated capital-adequacy ratios put in place after 2006 under 
the Basel II accord to replace the rough ratios of the first Basel accord were found to add, 
rather than to reduce, the pro-cyclicality of bank behavior. This is because they were 
themselves based on market valuations of assets and encouraged banks to expand their 
balance sheets in good times and to shrink them in bad times. 
In the US, risk-weighted capital ratios were supplemented with a cruder, non-risk weighted 
capital-to-asset ratio called a leverage ratio. Major bank holding companies (not investment 
banks) were required to hold Tier-1 capital (see Box 3) of at least 4% of their total assets.
12 
The US leverage ratio did not prevent the crisis but it may be the case, as argued by the Swiss 
vice-governor Philipp Hildebrand (2008), that “it ensures a minimal buffer to absorb the 
negative consequences of imprudent behavior.” World leaders decided at the G-20 Pittsburgh 
summit to incorporate it into the Basle II framework as a supplement to the capital-adequacy 
ratio, and to make it compulsory when valuation standards have converged sufficiently so that 
the denominator of the ratio is measured consistently across countries. 
                                                 
11   See Panetta and Angelini (2009). 
12    The link between the capital-to-asset and debt-to-asset ratios can be understood using the above 
notation:  K/A = 1/(1+l).  20
 
Box 3 – Why are capital-adequacy ratios procyclical? 
The setting of minimal capital requirements is intended to provide a buffer so that banks remain solvent across a 
wide range of shocks. As such, it is an application of the Value-at-Risk approach.  
Capital-adequacy ratios for internationally active banks were first introduced in 1988 by the Basel I accord, 
which imposed to banks a minimum capital of 8% of risk-weighted assets. Risk was supposed to depend on the 
asset class, so for example governments were deemed safe and corporate bonds risky. In the 1990s this crude 
approach was subject to criticism, which resulted in the introduction in the mid-2000s of the new Basel II ratios.  
Two categories of capital are distinguished: Tier 1 capital, which broadly corresponds to shareholder equity, and 
Tier 2 capital, consisting of reserves, provisions and subordinated debt. The 8% ratio determines total Tier 1 + 
Tier 2 capital, with the proviso that Tier 2 capital must be inferior or equal to Tier 1 capital. Basel II especially 
differs from Basel I in its approach to risk, which is not given for broad asset classes anymore but is asset-
dependent and time-varying. It can be calculated according to one of two methods, the standardized approach 
and the internal ratings-based approach. 
The standardized approach uses ratings published by the credit rating agencies to measure risk. Both loans to 
governments and loans to corporations are therefore deemed risky and enter into the calculation of total credit 
risk, with weights dependent on their ratings (for example, in the original Basel II framework claims on 
governments rated AAA did not enter into the calculation of total risk, while claims on governments rated BBB 
were taken into account for 50% of their value; for claims on corporations, the corresponding weights were 20% 
for AAA borrowers and 100% for BBB borrowers). Once the total risk has been calculated, the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (8% in the original Basel II framework) is applied to determine the bank’s minimum capital. 
Alternatively, banks can be authorized by their supervisor to use an internal ratings-based approach, whereby 
weights are determined by the bank’s own assessment of the riskiness of its claims on the basis of methodologies 
and parameters determined by the regulator. For example the original Basel II framework required banks to 
compute the maximum losses that the they could suffer at a 99.9% confidence interval. The bank would be 
required to hold at least enough capital to absorb this “maximum probable” loss. However, the evaluation of a 
borrower’s probability of default was left to the bank itself. The intention was to make better use of a bank’s 
internal information on the riskiness of its clients and to better take into account the correlation of risks across 
assets within the bank’s portfolio. 
The standard approach is subject to pro-cyclicality to the extent that credit ratings are themselves procyclical, 
which tends to be the case although rating agencies claim to smooth risk assessment over the cycle. Simple 
empirical evidence indicates that average ratings decline in a downturn, leading to an increase in capital 
requirements. Similarly they improve in boom times, relaxing capital requirements (Panetta and Angelini, 2009). 
Instead of dampening the pro-cyclical effects of leverage, regulation therefore tends to increase them.  
There is no direct empirical evidence yet on the internal ratings-based approach since it was introduced in 2008 
only (and only in Europe) but simulations have shown that it is likely to be open to the same criticism as the 
standard approach. For example Repullo and Suarez (2008) find that the Basel II framework provides better 
protection against bankruptcy than Basel I but that, since banks are unlikely to hold sufficient buffers above the 
minimum requirements, the increased risk of borrower default during a recession should imply credit contraction 
in downturns. 
d.  Market valuation 
It has been noted above that leverage leads banks to respond pro-cyclically to fluctuations in 
the value of their assets. This raises the question of how bank assets should be valued, which 
is a complex and as-yet unresolved question.  
In the years before the crisis, the financial reporting of banks had been increasingly based on 
so-called  fair-value or mark-to-market accounting: Assets and liabilities were reported at 
market value, with capital gains and losses being registered in the profit-and-loss account.  21
When market prices were not available, fair value was constructed by discounting expected 
future cash flows, based on some forecasting model. This principle was enshrined in the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), adopted by more than a hundred 
countries including EU member states, and in the US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).  
There are several issues with fair-value accounting: 
  Consistency between standards:  a given asset may be valued differently by the bank’s 
supervisor and by its auditors, and both standards may vary across countries. The 
Deutsche Bank, a German bank with significant US activities, reported total assets worth 
2,202 billion dollars under IFRS and 1,030 billion dollars under US GAAP as at 31 
December 2008. This is because financial derivatives are registered at gross value under 
IFRS and at net value under US GAAP; 
  Availability of market prices:  the crisis has led accounting standard-setters to 
acknowledge (somewhat reluctantly, at least initially) that market valuation is not possible 
when markets do not function. It may remain possible to discount expected future cash 
flows but investors are suspicious of biases in prices produced by fragile and potentially 
self-serving internal models; 
  Counter-intuitive outcomes:  as an example, when the creditworthiness of a bank 
deteriorates, the market value of its liabilities goes down and it can therefore register a 
profit; 
  Procyclicality:  a fall in asset prices induces banks to sell assets and contract credit in 
order to comply with capital requirements. Box 4 provides a telling illustration in the case 
of pension funds:  the combination of a strict pension funding rule and mark-to-market 
accounting produces an upward-sloping demand curve on asset markets:  when the price 
of bonds goes up, pension funds have to buy more of them. Such behaviors exacerbate 
disruptive market dynamics. 
There is a minority view that market valuation should be abandoned altogether in favor of 
historical cost valuation, or strictly limited to trading activities.
13 Based on the experience of 
past financial crises, the economics profession generally considers that this would obscure the 
perception of banks’ soundness, delay the necessary disposal of non-performing assets, and 
eventually aggravate the cost of crises. An alternative is to supplement mark-to-market 
accounting with appropriate clauses so as to mitigate its procyclicality, such as buffers to 
weather sudden drops in market prices, and with temporary waivers in case of a crisis.
14 
 
                                                 
13   In 2003, French President Jacques Chirac wrote to European Commission President Romano Prodi that 
the adoption of fair-value accounting would “lead to company management methods that will place excessive 
bias on the short term.” 
14   In response to the crisis, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) authorized the temporary reclassification of assets at book value rather than 
market value in October, 2008.  22
Box 4 - Pro-cyclical mark-to-market accounting:  the case of pension funds 
We illustrate here how mark-to-market accounting may force financial institutions to act in a pro-cyclical way on 
financial markets. The example is adapted from Boeri et al. (2006).  
Consider a pension fund with pension liabilities lt at all future dates t ≥ 0. For analytical convenience, we 
suppose the fund is entirely invested in perpetual bonds with a unitary face value, yielding a constant interest 
rate r. The market value of the bond portfolio is A = pN, where N is the number of bonds and p = 1/r is their unit 
price. The model is in continuous time. 
Looking forward, pension liabilities increase at a constant rate λ (say, because pensions are indexed on wage 
growth):  lt = l0 e
λt with 0 < λ < r. Since there is no active market for pension portfolios, their fair value L is 
computed using discounted expected cash flows: 
         ( 4 . 1 )  
Let ϕ = A/L be the funding gap of the pension fund, i.e. the discrepancy between its market-valued assets and 
liabilities. We define   as the duration of the bond portfolio and   as the 
duration of the pension portfolio. It appears immediately that d
A < d
L:  when interest rates go down (or, 
equivalently, when the price of bonds goes up), the value of liabilities increases more than the value of assets 
and the funding gap widens: 
            ( 4 . 2 )  
Suppose now that the price of bonds p fluctuates and the fund manager, facing a given liability portfolio, adjusts 
in real time the size N of the asset portfolio to match a given funding gap ϕ (say, as imposed by pension fund 
regulation). The manager’s rule is: 
        ( 4 . 3 )  
          ( 4 . 4 )  
Under the combination of a regulatory funding rule and mark-to-market accounting, the fund has to buy more 
bonds when their price goes up. When applied to the whole industry, such rules may exert a destabilizing, pro-
cyclical impact on bond markets. This impact was documented on the euro and sterling bond markets when 
pension-fund regulation was tightened and moved to mark-to-market valuation in Scandinavia, then in the UK in 
the early 2000s (Boeri et al., 2006). 
e.  Why did the subprime crisis trigger a generalized panic? 
It is now time to repeat our second question, i.e. why a crisis in a limited segment of financial 
markets, namely the subprime market, contaminated the entire financial system. Contagion 
cannot be ascribed primarily to the weight of subprime securities in investors’ portfolios.  
As developed by Gorton (2008b, 2009), special investment vehicles had broadly diversified 
portfolios and were not significantly exposed to subprime loans. A key element of crisis 
extension was the development of a market for repurchase agreements or repos (see Box 5) 
which played for firms a role akin to that of a banking system:  lending firms deposited cash, 
borrowing firms posted bonds as collateral and this collateral could in turn be 
‘rehypothecated’ in exchange for cash with a third party. The posting of securitized assets as 
collateral therefore provided the means to meet the borrowing needs of some firms and the 
demand for liquid, informationally insensitive deposits of some other. However, it also 
increased the complexity so that information on the distribution of risks was hardly available 
and increasingly costly to assemble. It also resulted in an exponentially increasing demand for 
safe assets to be used as collateral – we will come back to this point later.  23
Box 5 – Repo transactions 
Repurchase agreements, or repos, are short-term loans backed by an exchange of collateral.  
Counterparty risk is only residual provided that the amount of collateral is revised frequently enough to offset 
the change in value of the asset deposited as collateral. This is usually done through cash deposits called margin 
calls. Typically, Bank A borrows X million dollars from Bank B for a given, short period of time and transfers to 
Bank B the property of a pool of assets worth the same amount for the life of the loan. Bank B then regularly 
checks the market value of these assets. If they have depreciated by x%, Bank A transfers to Bank B an 
additional xX million dollars in cash as a margin call. This ensures that bank B’s loss will be limited if Bank A 
defaults. An alternative, which can be combined with margin calls, is to impose an arbitrary rebate on the value 
of collateral (called a haircut), depending on its creditworthiness. This increases the quantity of collateral 
required in exchange of a given monetary amount. 
Repos involve less counterparty risk than uncollateralized bank loans and have therefore developed very rapidly. 
While there are few statistics about this market, it was believed to exceed 11 trillion dollars in 2008 and to have 
grown by around 10 percent a year.  
 
As long as the system expanded steadily, no question needed to be raised about the quality of 
collateral. But the leveraging and tranching mechanism implied that the price of a subprime 
asset-based security was a highly non-linear function of house prices. In spite of the moderate 
share of subprime bonds in the pool of asset-based securities, the bursting of the real-estate 
bubble transformed what was perceived as ‘informationally insensitive’ into ‘informationally 
sensitive’ debt, to use Gorton’s expression.  
However, the complexity of the whole chain of structured financial products meant that the 
information necessary to properly value claims was not accessible. No one could accept 
structured products as collateral any longer. The subprime crisis thus translated into a 
collateral crisis and a dash for cash. Depositors were not able to assess counterparty risk. 
Average repo haircuts exploded, from zero in the first half of 2007 to 25% by mid 2008 and 
more than 45% by the end of 2008. The repo market dried up. The demand for cash could 
only be met by selling assets at much reduced prices, so that the price of non-subprime related 
assets also fell substantially. The mark-to-market value of all assets collapsed, feeding back 
into a further drying up of the repo market and solvency problems for financial 
intermediaries. The failure of Lehman further compounded both the signal, the dash for cash 
and the panic.  
As suggested by Holmström (2008), this information-asymmetry problem was not primarily 
one of transparency, but rather one of complexity. The whole system thrived on non-
transparent information, and it is when price information became more collective and 
transparent that the panic unfolded. 
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1.5.  Macro roots 
“At the core of the crisis lay an interplay between macro-imbalances which had grown 
rapidly in the last ten years, and financial market developments and innovations”. The gist of 
this sentence, from the Turner Review (Financial Services Authority, 2009) commissioned by 
the British government, can be found in many other assessments by experts and, interestingly, 
regulators.
15 Beyond the microeconomic roots and the failures of regulation, broader 
permissive factors were conducive to financial imprudence.  
In fact, if interest rates had been higher, housing booms, stock market valuations, and the rise 
in private debt would certainly not have reached the same levels. Cheap credit facilitated 
debt-financed investment in real estate and financial assets, and contributed to excessive risk-
taking. From a macroeconomic standpoint also, this crisis has been a crisis of leverage (Figure 
2).  
Figure 2 – The rise of private debt between 1999 and 2007 
Interest-rate liabilities (loans and non-equity securities) as % of GDP 
 
Source:  Eurostat, ECB, Federal Reserve and Barclays Capital. 
Almost by definition, macroeconomic factors therefore played a role in the boom-bust cycle, 
because interest rates affect the demand for credit:  there is necessarily an interest-rate level 
that would have prevented the boom. But the interesting question is what created this 
macroeconomic environment. Was it a failure of monetary policy? Was the broader saving-
investment balance at global level the root cause of the low interest rates it produced? 
                                                 
15   See for example the De Larosière (2009) report prepared at the request of the European Commission.   25
Although mutually compatible, those two explanations have quite different policy 
implications. 
a.  A failure of monetary policy? 
A first explanation blames an exceedingly lax monetary policy, either in the US (Taylor, 
2008) or globally (BIS, 2008). According to this view, monetary policy in the aftermath of the 
2001 recession remained too lax for too long and this triggered both asset-price inflation, 
primarily but not exclusively on the US housing market, and a generalized leverage boom.  
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of policy interest rates (the Fed Fund rates) and of 10-year 
Treasury interest rates from the late 1990s to the late 2000s. The dashed line, taken from 
Taylor (2009), represents the counterfactual Fed Funds evolution that would have been 
observed had the central bank followed a Taylor rule (see Section 2 below). The Fed would 
have tightened faster after the 2001 recession, instead of lowering interest rates further to 
counter perceived deflation risks. Accordingly, short-term rates would have been higher 
between 2001 and 2005, denting the housing price boom and making the subsequent bust less 
pronounced.  
Figure 3 - US interest rates, 1999-2009 
 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
In retrospect, the Fed should have worried less about the deflation risk in 2003, when then 
board member Ben Bernanke famously outlined a contingency plan to avoid the repetition of 
the Japanese experience (Bernanke, 2002), and it should have worried more about the risks of 
a housing bubble, instead of claiming, as then-chairman Alan Greenspan did, that “while local 
economies may experience significant speculative price imbalances, a national severe 
[housing] price distortion seems most unlikely in the United States.” (Greenspan, 2004). This 
illustrates the difficult art of risk-management in economic policymaking:  faced with these 
two equally improbable outcomes, the Fed may have overstated the former and disregarded 
the latter.  26
The question, however, is whether this explanation is sufficient: 
•  To start with, the Taylor rule can only give rough indications and cannot be taken as an 
undisputable benchmark. Consumer-price inflation remained rather subdued throughout 
the 2000-2006 period and accelerated only with the world commodity-price boom of 
2007-2008. A reason for continued price stability was the flattening of the Phillips curve. 
Central-bank credibility, structural changes in the US labor market and the increase in the 
global labor force resulting from China’s and India’s increased participation in 
globalization all resulted in a containment of wage and price increases. A central bank 
dedicated to price stability (rather to a combination of inflation and the output gap, as in 
the Taylor rule) had therefore little reason to raise interest rates aggressively enough to 
prick the real-estate bubble; 
•  The question, therefore, is rather whether the Fed should have raised interest rates in the 
name of financial stability. John Taylor implicitly assumes that by following a Taylor 
rule it would have killed two birds with one stone – achieving both macroeconomic and 
financial stability. But there is no theoretical or empirical motive to believe that the two 
objectives are coincident: whether central banks should explicitly target asset prices when 
setting interest rates has been a matter for debate. Put simply, it implies that central banks 
stand ready to depart from their macroeconomic stability goal in the name of financial 
stability – not something they can consider lightly. On a more practical ground, whether 
the Fed could have steered interest rates delicately enough to engineer a soft landing of 
housing prices is dubious; 
•  Furthermore, from 2001 on, long-term interest rates remained remarkably stable at a low 
level (Figure 3) consistent with stable inflationary expectations. This stability, famously 
dubbed a ‘conundrum’ by Alan Greenspan (2005), contrasted with previous episodes 
when bond rates responded to movement in policy rates, and it suggests that, if the Fed 
had followed John Taylor’s ex-post prescription, bond rates could have remained at a low 
level. This leads us to consider the structural reasons for the persistence of low long-term 
interest rates throughout the early 2000s.  
b.  A consequence of global imbalances? 
An alternative macroeconomic explanation focuses on global imbalances rather than on 
purely domestic developments. According to this view, the increased demand for safe assets 
associated with capital flows into the US favored leverage and even provided incentives to 
manufacture purportedly AAA assets of actually dubious quality.  
The starting point for this analysis is the observation of a massive inflow of foreign savings 
into the US. As the US came out of the 2001 recession, a new global saving-investment 
pattern emerged that characterized the 2002-2007 period.
16 What became known as ‘global 
imbalances’ was the combination of an historically high, and growing US current-account 
deficit of the order of 1.5% of world GDP (average over the 2002-2007 period), and 
                                                 
16   As documented elsewhere in this book, the US current-account deficit goes back in fact to the very 
early 1980s. It had improved by the turn of the 1990s before deteriorating sharply in the second half of the 
decade.  27
corresponding surpluses in East Asia and later in the oil-producing countries. During this 
period foreign net purchases of US Treasury securities always represented more than 60% of 
net issues and for the entire period they amounted to 81% of total net issues.
17  
In the early 2000s, the traditional view of global imbalances – a view generally endorsed by 
Europeans - was that they were primarily driven by the US saving behavior – in other words 
that they resulted from a domestically rooted drop in the US saving rate. In the mid 2000s, 
however, Ben Bernanke put forward an alternative explanation, deemed the ‘global savings 
glut’ hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005). According to this view, the global savings-investment 
pattern originated in an increase in the rest of the world’s net saving rather than resulting 
primarily from US behavior.  
However self-serving for the US, Bernanke’s provocative thesis rightly pointed out that 
financial globalization and the appetite of emerging countries for US Treasury bonds had to 
feature in the analysis of global imbalances. The question became: why was the rest of the 
world so keen on investing in US assets? Three main rationalizations have been offered for 
such behavior:  the asset shortage, self-insurance and Bretton Woods 2 hypotheses. 
The  asset-shortage hypothesis presented in Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) and 
Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2008) highlights that financial underdevelopment in 
emerging countries led domestic agents to export their savings and invest them in [US] assets 
of higher safety and quality. This simultaneously resulted in a US financial account surplus 
(and a corresponding current account deficit) and in a lowering of long-term interest rates, as 
foreign savings increased the demand for financial assets. This intellectually attractive 
explanation has however not been tested extensively. There are other, more structural reasons 
for the higher demand for risk-free assets, such as the development of repos and over-the-
counter derivative contracts which have brought about a massive demand for high-quality 
collateral (Gorton, 2009). 
Furthermore, the asset-shortage hypothesis does not explain why the emerging countries’ 
investment in the US overwhelmingly came from central banks:  according to the IMF’s 
COFER data (which are far from exhaustive as many central banks do not disclose the 
allocation of their reserves), the developing and emerging countries’ dollar reserves rose from 
$258bn in 1999Q1 (in the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis), to $2,254bn in 2008Q2 
(before the turmoil that followed the Lehman collapse), an almost tenfold increase in less than 
ten years. 
One rationale for such accumulation was to avoid a repetition of the 1997 balance-of-payment 
Asian crisis and subsequent dependence on IMF financings, perceived as costly and 
humiliating:  instead, international reserves were used as self-insurance against future crises. 
This rationalization, however, is not entirely satisfactory either:  self-insurance may explain a 
one-off increase in foreign-exchange reserves but the continuous accumulation of low-
yielding reserves involves a significant opportunity cost that is hard to justify from a social 
planner’s point of view (Rodrik, 2006).  
                                                 
17   Data here are taken respectively from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and the US Flow of Funds 
statistics.   28
Another rationale, especially in China, was the export-oriented growth strategy that implied 
keeping the currency undervalued through repeated interventions on the foreign-exchange 
market. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) spoke of a ‘Bretton Woods 2 regime’ to 
describe the resulting web of explicit or implicit exchange-rate arrangements between the 
dollar and the developing and emerging countries’ currencies. The bulk of corresponding 
central-bank reserves was held in US Treasury bonds because they were the most liquid (and 
supposedly the safest) securities in the world and because the currencies were de facto pegged 
to the dollar).  
Whether or not global imbalances were sustainable has been a matter for fierce debate within 
the economic profession. For some scholars (e.g. Engel and Rogers, 2006) the US current- 
account deficit was the perfectly natural result of intertemporal optimization by US 
consumers, while for others (Obstfeld and Rogoff, Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa, 2005), it was 
unsustainable in the long run. The latter, however, generally expected a precipitous decline in 
the US-dollar exchange rate, possibly accompanied by a sell-off of US government bonds, not 
a domestic financial crisis. 
After the event, the crisis revealed an unanticipated link between the foreign search for safe 
assets and US domestic risk-taking. Intuitively, the low level of long-term rates resulting from 
capital inflows led investors from the US and other industrialized countries to diversify away 
from ‘plain-vanilla’ US Treasury securities and look for higher-yield paper, thereby 
encouraging investment banks to manufacture securities that were granted AAA status by 
rating agencies but which offered a higher return than Treasury bonds. CDOs, or at least the 
degree of success of CDOs, were the product of this link. The US was playing its traditional 
role as the ‘world venture capitalist’,
18 borrowing from risk-adverse Asian investors and 
investing into risky assets. However, these were no longer productive investments but toxic 
leveraged products. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) provide a simple model of such a 
link between global imbalances and US financial fragility and show how foreign demand for 
safe US assets could contribute to the rise of leverage and the fall in risk premiums (Box 6).
19 
The link between global imbalances, low long-term interest rates and leverage has, however, 
not been documented empirically. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) dispute it, at least 
implicitly. Instead of putting the emphasis on net savings flows (as the global-imbalances 
approach does), they prefer instead to emphasize the role of gross cross-border holdings of 
financial assets in the transmission of the crisis from the US to Europe. Both explanations, 
however, are compatible. Linkages between global imbalances, low long-term interest rates, 
leverage and the development of new financial products have not yet been assessed 
systematically. Warnock and Warnock (2009) explore the impact of foreign official capital 
inflows on US long-term interest rates and find that they may have depressed them by close to 
100 basis points in 2005, which is not a trivial effect. In a broader perspective, Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009) discuss the impact of low interest rates on financial innovation and claim that 
global imbalances and the crisis had common causes. 
                                                 
18   The expression is borrowed from Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey (2007). 
19   See also Brender and Pisani (2009).  29
Box 6 – Global imbalances and US financial fragility:  a simple model 
The model, adapted from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009), has three agents:  domestic financial firms, 
domestic investors, and foreign investors.  
Domestic financial firms generate a cash flow Xt per unit of time that comes from their portfolios of loans, e.g. 
mortgages. Let Vt be the present value of these future cash flows. The financial firms are leveraged and issue 
debt to the amount of Bt. The debt is deemed safe and pays the risk-free interest rate r. The equity value of the 
financial firms is therefore: 
Wt = Vt - Bt           ( 6 . 1 )  
Domestic investors hold financial firms’ equity and their wealth is therefore Wt. They consume a fixed fraction 
ρWt  of their wealth per unit of time, in conformity with a behavior optimally derived from log preferences. 
Foreign investors are more risk-adverse and hold only debt Bt (think of foreign central bank holdings). They 
invest a flow Xt
* and repatriate a fraction ρ
∗Βt of their wealth per unit of time.  
These are crude assumptions intended to capture the behavior of US and foreign emerging countries’ investors in 
the 2000s. It would not change the results to assume that the two categories of investors hold both equity and 
debt as long as they have a different preference for the two categories of assets.  
The goods market equilibrium writes: 
t t t t B X X W
* * ρ ρ − + =         ( 6 . 2 )  
That is, domestic consumption equals the income stream from financial firms plus net capital inflows. This 
equation can be solved for the equity value of domestic financial firms: 
           ( 6 . 3 )  
The first term on the right-hand side indicates that foreign demand for riskless assets increases the equity value 
of financial firms, i.e. of domestic risky assets (and therefore the wealth of domestic residents W). This is 
because leverage brought about by the foreign demand for safe assets increases the value of equity. The second 
term indicates that the increase is stronger if foreign asset-holders have a lower propensity to consume 
(repatriate) their wealth than domestic asset holders. 
In the same way it can be shown that if capital inflows are stable, then the foreign demand for safe assets lowers 
the risk premium on domestic risky assets. 
1.6.  The “Black Swan” syndrome 
Complex systems are prone to accidents and the more integrated they are, the more 
catastrophic the accident can be. Financial markets are specialized in dealing with risk but are 
not prepared to face extreme events. When such events materialize, the whole system may 
collapse. “Complexity got the better of us,” wrote Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein in 
February 2009, adding that we should resist a response, however, that is solely designed 
around protecting us from the 100-year storm because “taking risk completely out of the 
system will be at the cost of economic growth” (Blankfein, 2009). 
Very few observers, if any, go as far as saying that the crisis was purely a ‘Black Swan’, i.e. a 
large-impact, low-probability event against which any protection would be exceedingly 
costly.
20 But many give it a certain weight and use it to caution against the temptation to 
overprotect. It is also a challenging intellectual hypothesis that deserves to be explored.  
                                                 
20    The black-swan metaphor is attributed to Nassim Nicolas Taleb (2007) and has its root in the 
observation by Karl Popper, the 20
th century philosopher, that seeing no black swan was not a proof that black 
swans did not exist.   30
As already observed, the subprime crisis was in itself a relatively minor event. According to 
the IMF (2008), the losses on US non-prime mortgage loans that set in motion the dramatic 
chain of crisis events stood in October 2008 at some 100 billion dollars. This corresponded to 
just 0.7 percent of US GDP and 0.2 percent of world GDP, a small amount in comparison to 
eventual, global losses. Even the higher estimates of losses on related mortgage-based 
securities (500 billion dollars according to the same source) were second-order in comparison 
to losses incurred in the early 1990s with the US Savings and Loans crisis (about 700 billion 
dollars, equivalent to 1700 billion dollars in 2008 terms) and even more to those that resulted 
from the dotcom crash of 2001-2002. Similar comparisons could be made with the emerging 
markets crises of the 1990s. Yet the consequences of the previous episodes remained 
contained. 
We have explained what role the use of securitized assets as collateral has played in the 
transmission of the shock. But the issue runs deeper. Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England’s 
director for financial stability, has drawn interesting comparisons with collapse phenomena 
affecting other complex, network-based systems such as electricity grids and complex 
ecosystems, for example rainforests or fish stocks. Such systems exhibit strong non-linearities 
in response to shocks and, according to Haldane, they are at the same time both robust and 
fragile. Their complexity and connectivity makes them resilient to a wide range of shocks 
because “the system acts as a mutual insurance device with disturbances dispersed and 
dissipated. Connectivity engenders robustness. Risk-sharing – diversification – prevails. But 
beyond a certain range, the system can flip the wrong side of the knife-edge. Interconnections 
serve as shock-amplifiers, not dampeners, as losses cascade. The system acts not as a mutual 
insurance device but as a mutual incendiary device” (Haldane, 2009). 
There is strong evidence that the very strategies that were intended to limit risk – especially 
securitization and insurance through derivative products – dramatically increased the 
complexity of the financial system and at the same time reduced its diversity, because all 
firms were following similar strategies and were making themselves vulnerable to the same 
events. “In just about every non-financial discipline,” Haldane observes, “this evolution 
would have set alarm bells ringing. Based on their experience, complexity plus homogeneity 
did not spell stability; it spelt fragility.”  
So the black-swan hypothesis may be less reassuring than at first sight. Instead of being an 
unpredictable, once-in-a-century event, big crises may be an endogenous property of a robust-
yet-fragile system in the same way collapses are an endogenous property of the robust-yet-
fragile integrated electricity grids. If this is the case, responses should focus not on checking 
whether each and every part of the system is in good shape but on improving the stability of 
the whole. This may imply stress-testing the financial system, i.e. assessing the impact on 
banks’ balance sheets of various scenarios involving the propagation of shocks across the 
financial system, and protecting vital elements of the financial system from the contagion of 
its riskier segments – as was done after the Great Depression with the introduction of the 
Glass-Steagall Act that separated investment banking from commercial banking – or giving to 
a specific institution the mandate to oversee global financial stability, over and above the 
mission industry regulators are entrusted with. We return to these issues in Section 3.  31
1.7.  Lessons 
It would be vain to try to determine which of the three approaches to the crisis reviewed 
above is the most relevant, or even to establish a hierarchy between these different sets of 
potential causes. The reason is that they touch upon different policy domains – financial 
regulation, monetary policy, international coordination – and they are mutually reinforcing. 
For instance, excess leverage due to insufficient regulation was encouraged by low interest 
rates. Why were interest rates so low? The Fed’s monetary policy provides an immediate 
answer. But without international appetite for US Treasuries, the US dollar would have been 
weaker, triggering import-price inflation and forcing the Fed to increase interest rates. And at 
longer horizons, interest rates are determined by international capital markets rather than by 
local monetary policy. More directly, the global demand for US dollars spurred the 
production of dollar-denominated assets. 
More generally, through its basic ingredients, this crisis resembles previous crises 
experienced throughout history: asset-price bubbles financed through leveraging followed by 
a market scramble. Why, then, was the crisis not anticipated? The reason is twofold. 
First, as argued above, the roots of the crisis are to be found in different spheres. Robert 
Shiller of Yale warned against the risks of a US housing-price collapse. The IMF repeatedly 
pointed out the burgeoning US current-account deficit, and Nouriel Roubini of New York 
University anticipated a dollar crisis. Michel Aglietta of Paris-Nanterre and Claudio Borio of 
the BIS warned policy-makers against systemic risk developing in the banking sector (see 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009, for an account of the various stages of the pre-crisis discussion). 
But few economists were able to embrace all dimensions of the crisis, from accounting and 
banking standards to global current-account imbalances, from the intricacy of ABS markets to 
off-balance banking conduits. 
Second, after an unprecedented period of expansion, and a succession of eventually benign 
financial crises, the crisis found policy-makers and their advisors sleeping at the wheel. The 
crisis of the junk-bond market in 1989, the demise of LTCM in 1998, the bursting of the dot-
com bubble in 2001 were all significant events in the financial sphere, but none of them 
resulted in a world recession. This created a false belief in the robustness of the system and a 
sense of complacency, which was proved wrong by the 2007-2008 crisis. More globally, 
crisis prevention faces the well-known hurdles of collective action: the change of behavior 
that is necessary to heed the various signals that are always available not only requires 
individual wisdom but makes sense only if it is implemented collectively. This is the role of 
politics.  32
2.  EXTRAORDINARY TIMES 
A clear pattern emerging from the evolution of policy thinking and policy making in the post-
war period has been a guarded approach to government intervention. In the mid 2000s, 
virtually any minister, central banker or regulator in the world contemplating policy action 
started off by asking himself or herself whether public intervention was necessary and 
whether it would risk doing more harm than good. Even those who (like us) did not share a 
belief in the self-regulating character of markets acknowledged that government failures were 
probably as pervasive as market failures and that before embarking on public intervention a 
thorough examination of the pros and cons was needed. 
Another, related, pattern of policy-making has been the increased emphasis on predictability. 
In accordance with the rational-expectation paradigm, economic policy came to be seen in 
late 20
th century as a repeated game against intelligent players. The consequence was to lay 
stress on the clarity of objectives and the growing importance of policy rules – even when 
rules were intended to serve as benchmarks rather than strict guidelines. This pattern was 
especially apparent in Europe where policy by rules was enshrined in the EU treaty.  
Crisis management, however, calls for a different kind of policy behavior. In the same way 
wartime governance departs from peacetime governance, it involves actions that break down 
the traditional boundaries between private and public domains and disregard rules-based 
guideposts. Instead of predictability it requires speed of action, flexibility and innovativeness. 
It thus brings policy-making onto entirely new territory where the usual compass is of little 
use beyond drawing attention to the inevitable day of reckoning when the full costs of 
heterodoxy need to be dealt with. This section is about this new territory. 
2.1.  Economic policy without the visual compass 
Central banks embarked in August 2007 on providing wholesale liquidity to financial 
institutions – not knowing, at the time, how far the journey would take them. In October 2008, 
governments came to the rescue of ailing banks in order to avoid further bankruptcies and to 
revive the credit channel. Simultaneously, central banks lowered interest rates aggressively, 
soon reaching the zero bound, while fiscal policy turned expansionary. 
a.  The rescue of ailing banks 
From the 1980s until the mid 2000s, privatization had been a policy motto in both developed 
and developing countries. Empirical research had supported the proposition that privately 
owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparable state-owned firms  
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). Unless there was a clearly stated general interest argument, 
public ownership of commercial banks or non-financial companies was regarded as evidence 
of a lack of clear policy objectives and was even considered as a handicap as it confronted 
policy-makers with a conflict of interest between their role as shareholders and their role as 
regulators. Either banks benefited from privileged access to government support, which raised 
competition concerns, or they had to behave like private banks, which deprived public 
ownership of any purpose. In most countries consequences were drawn:  the public banking 
sector was limited to general-interest institutions such as development banks, and when it  33
survived its privileges were eventually sacrificed on the altar of competition, as for the 
Länder guarantee of the borrowing of the German Landesbanken*.
21 
In 2008, however, governments in most countries had hurriedly to reverse this stance and 
found themselves doing the opposite of what they had claimed was their doctrine. Capital 
injections into banks amounted in most cases to several percentage points of GDP (up to 5.1% 
in the Netherlands, a small country with two major international banks),
22 either through 
outright participation and control of the bank, or by subscribing to preferred shares (see Box 
7) to avoid taking control. 
When a large bank is unable to roll over its debt in spite of short-term liquidity provision by 
the central bank and faces a threat of failure, the government can either let the bank fail – and 
possibly face the systemic consequences; or it can save the bank and in the process bail out its 
depositors and lenders, thereby creating moral hazard. Bank failures are not exceptional 
events. In 2008, 26 US deposit banks were allowed to fail, a number still small in historical 
terms (Figure 4).
23 Most of the time, the failed banks were small enough not to trigger a 
domino effect in the banking system.  
Figure 4 - Bank failures in the US, 2000-2009 
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Source: FDIC 
Lehman Brothers’ failure could have been a salutary reminder to all holders of bank shares of 
the risk associated with the high returns on their holdings, thereby helping to keep moral 
hazard in check. In fact, it turned to disaster due to the size and interconnectedness of 
Lehman. Only three weeks after its failure, on 10 October 2008, G7 finance ministers 
announced an unequivocal change of course, saying that they would “use all available tools 
to support systemically important financial institutions and prevent their failure”.
24 
                                                 
21   The regional banks (Landesbanken) were forced by the European Commission to abandon their state 
guarantees because these represented a distortion of competition. This termination resulted in a borrowing spree 
before the expiration of the guarantee in 2005 and its proceeds gave rise to hazardous investment in high-
yielding assets such as US mortgage-based securities to compensate for the loss of low-cost funding. 
22   Panetta  et al. (2009), table 1.2. 
23   More than 500 deposit banks failed in 1989, and up to 4,000 in 1934. See Gorton (2009). 
24   Still, some analysts question the wisdom of that change and argue that letting Lehman fail was the best 
course of action (e.g. Steil, 2009).   34
The question had moved from whether to intervene to how to intervene. In this respect, past 
crisis episodes have yielded two major lessons: 
  It is of utmost importance to prevent the economy from sliding into paralysis and to avoid 
setting deflationary mechanisms in motion. The policy response needs to be of the ‘shock-
and-awe’ type. Monetary and fiscal policies can be powerful in alleviating the impact of 
the crisis in the short and medium run; however, as shown by the Japanese example, there 
cannot be a sustained recovery as long as banks are paralyzed and unable to extend credit 
(Box 7); 
Box 7 – A tale of two banking crises:  Sweden and Japan 
While the crisis that erupted in 2007 was the first global crisis of this sort since the 1930s, it was by no means 
the first banking crisis in modern times. On the contrary there was extensive international experience with such 
crises in developed and developing countries (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Two examples were studied 
especially closely, those of Sweden in the early 1990s and Japan from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. In both 
cases the country suffered from a severe banking crisis resulting in massive losses and the insolvency of a large 
part of the banking sector.  
Measures introduced by the government were broadly similar:  in a first phase, liquidity was extended to ailing 
banks, a blanket guarantee of deposits was introduced to avoid panic; banks were thereafter nationalized, 
recapitalized through the injection of public funds, restructured, merged, and eventually privatized; and non-
performing assets were transferred to public asset-management companies in charge of selling them. But the 
timing was very different:  the Swedish government acted swiftly and decisively to ward off the crisis and 
adopted a hands-on approach to bank rescue and restructuring, while several years passed until the reality of the 
crisis was recognized in Japan and even more before the problem was addressed. Three years into the crisis, 50% 
of the losses had been recognized in the accounts of the Swedish banks, against 10% in Japan (Figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1 -Cumulative bank write-downs:  Sweden and Japan 
   
Source:  Hoshi and Kashyap (2008), Bank of Sweden, and Bruegel calculations. 
As a consequence, the crisis lasted longer and was significantly more costly in budgetary terms in Japan (Table 
7.1). The reason why the outcome was so different is that delaying restructuring does not add to the chances of 
spontaneous recovery, rather it generally leads to further losses. For instance, credit restrictions raise the failure 
rate of enterprises, thus changing healthy loans into non-performing ones. Then more capital needs to be injected 
into banks, creating more public debt while GDP – the denominator of the debt ratio – tends to stagnate. Japan 
thus seemingly managed to limit the short-term economic impact of the crisis as compared to Sweden, but at the 
price of a slow-growing potential GDP: 1,1% yearly growth on average between 1997 and 2006 for Japan, 
versus 1.7% and 2,6% over 1987-96 and 1997-2006 respectively for Sweden (source: OECD, Economic Outlook 
85, June 2009). 
 
Table 7.1 – Cost of the banking crisis:  Sweden and Japan 
 
  Sweden  Japan 
Start  1991  1997
a 
End
b  1996  2005 
Length (years)  ≤ 5  ≥ 8 
Cost of bank recapitalization (% of GDP) 
-  Gross 
-  Net 
 
1.9 
1.5 
 
6.7 
6.6 
Gross public debt ratio increase (start to end, percentage points)  39  76 
Output loss (first three years, cumulative, in percent of trend GDP)
c  31  18 
Notes: The Japanese banking crisis began to develop following the stock-market crash in 1990 and the decline 
in real-estate prices, but the onset of the banking crisis is generally considered to be the failures of Sanyo 
Securities and Yamaichi Securities in November 1997 and resulting disturbances on the interbank market. It is 
only at that time that the extent of the damage began to be recognized. 
Date of removal of the blanket deposit guarantee (this tends to overestimate the duration of the crisis) 
Sum of the differences between trend and actual GDP over three years, divided by trend GDP. 
Source:  Laeven and Valencia (2008), OECD data, and authors’ calculations. 
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  Partial injections of capital into the banking sector are of limited effectiveness as long as 
assets of uncertain value remain on the banks’ balance sheets. Creditors remain wary of 
the soundness of the bank, which in turn leads it to err on the side of caution and restrict 
credit. A comprehensive cleaning up of balance sheets, and transparency as to their 
content and resilience to stress scenarios, are preconditions for credit revival.  
As a consequence, government should intervene both on the liability side of banks’ balance 
sheets through capital injections, refinancing, and bank debt guarantees, and on the asset side 
by buying assets or guaranteeing their value. All these instruments are detailed in Box 8. 
Box 8 – A primer on bank losses and rescue 
To understand the impact of bank losses and the options for government rescue, it is best to start from a very 
simple example. Assume the balance sheet of a bank prior to the crisis looks as follows (see Table 8.1):   
 
Table 8.1 - A bank balance sheet before the crisis 
 
   Assets  Liabilities 
Toxic assets  20  Equity  10 
Other financial assets  20  Debt  50 
Loans  50  Deposits  40 
Cash  10     
Total  100  Total  100 
On the asset side the bank holds cash, loans and standard financial assets as well as toxic assets supposedly 
worth 20. The term ‘toxic assets’ refers to assets whose market value is highly uncertain – although this may not 
be duly recognized in the absence of a crisis (for example, mortgage-backed securities whose yield depends on 
the stream of interests and repayments on mortgage loans to subprime creditors).  
On the liability side it receives deposits from customers and issues debt. In this simplified example the difference 
between the market value of its assets and that of its liabilities is its equity, that is, the value of the bank’s shares. 
It is assumed that assets and non-equity liabilities are evaluated at market value (for a discussion of market 
valuation, see Section 3).  
Suppose now that the toxic assets held by the bank lose half of their value. The total assets of the bank are now 
worth 90 instead of 100 but liabilities to creditors and depositors have not diminished. This implies a loss of 10 
on its profit-and-loss account and therefore a write-down on its capital that brings its equity to zero (see Table 
8.2). As a consequence it is bankrupt. It can repay its creditors and depositors by selling off its remaining assets 
(assuming they can be sold at their book value) but cannot remain in business. 
 
Table 8.2 - The bank incurs losses on ‘toxic’ assets 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
Toxic assets  10  Equity  0 
Other financial assets  20  Debt  50 
Loans  50  Deposits  40 
Cash  10     
Total  90  Total  90 
The bank can however refuse to recognize the extent of its losses and mark down its toxic assets at 15 instead of 
10. This has two consequences:   
First, it is vulnerable to creditors’ suspicion:  customers may withdraw their money because they fear an outright 
default (this is what happened in 2008 to Northern Rock, the British bank) and other banks may refuse to renew 
credit (this is what happened on the interbank market starting in August 2007). It is therefore likely to call on, 
and depend on, central bank credit as a substitute for private credit. 
Second, it is undercapitalized, because the loss of 5 that it has recognized on its assets implies a corresponding 
write-down on its equity. As a consequence the bank needs to raise capital or to reduce both its assets and non- 37
equity liabilities to a level consistent with its remaining capital. This results in a non-renewal of existing loans to 
clients and in a reduction of the volume of new loans.  
‘Zombie banks’ of this sort are a dangerous species. First, they may at any time fail to meet their obligations and 
trigger a chain of defaults and therefore make the entire financial system more fragile. Second, they are inclined 
to ration credit and therefore impose costs on the non-financial sector. This is why swift government intervention 
is necessary to force banks to recognize their losses and operate a triage between the profitable, the viable and 
the bankrupt ones.  
Governments can intervene either through the liability or through the asset side of the balance sheet. In the first 
case the most straightforward way to proceed is to nationalize the bank at no cost (since the value of its equity is 
zero) and inject new capital in the form of equity. In the absence of outright nationalization the government can 
inject capital through other channels such as preferred stocks or preferred shares.a Assuming the government 
injects both equity and preferred stock, the balance sheet now looks as follows (Table 8.3):   
 
Table 8.3 - The bank is recapitalized by government 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
Toxic assets  10  Equity  5 
Other financial assets  20  Preferred stock  5 
Loans  50  Debt  50 
Cash  20  Deposits  40 
Total  100  Total  100 
Another way to proceed, if the government does not want to nationalize banks, is to purchase toxic assets at an 
inflated price (Table 8.4). For example, toxic assets can be isolated by setting up a bad bank.b This is another 
way to inject cash into the bank, but with very different distributional consequences. Instead of buying up a bank 
at zero cost (and possibly making a profit on its resale) the government buys toxic assets above market value and 
therefore makes a sure loss. The value of private shareholders’ equity is thus indirectly subsidized, whereas they 
would be wiped out in the case of nationalization. These distributional consequences stand as political-economy 
arguments against setting up bad banks, even though this may be an effective solution to deal with toxic assets. 
 
Table 8.4 - Toxic assets are bought by government above market value 
Assets    Liabilities   
Toxic assets  0  Equity  10 
Other financial assets  20  Debt  50 
Loans  50  Deposits  40 
Cash  30     
Total  100  Total  100 
a.  Preferred stocks are stocks which deliver a higher yield but which carry no voting rights. In case of bankruptcy, 
preferred stockholders are paid before stockholders and after bondholders. 
b.  A ‘bad bank’ is a temporary, public-funded financial structure designed to manage a set of assets taken out of ailing 
banks in order for the latter to be able to restart exposure to new risks through lending and to qualify as ‘good banks’. 
All types of intervention have been used to varying degrees during the crisis. A radical 
combination used by Sweden in the 1990s was to nationalize, remove toxic assets from 
banks’ balance sheets, sell the banks back to the private sector and use the proceeds to 
compensate for losses suffered on toxic assets. The ultimate net fiscal cost of the Swedish 
rescue plan was small:  1.5% of GDP as compared to 6.6% of GDP in Japan (Box 7). 
However, only four banks were concerned at that time. Generalizing such a scheme to many 
banks in many countries was deemed impossible, notably when taking political constraints 
into account. Furthermore, in Europe, nationalizing banks with large cross-border activities 
would have required a level of coordination which could not be attained in the heat of battle 
and given the subsequent need to decide on how the fiscal burden would be shared.   38
Rather, bank recapitalization plans were carried out on a country-by-country basis, with 
striking differences of degree and procedure (Table 2).  
Table 2 – Bank rescue measures adopted in 2008-2009 in selected countries (% of GDP) 
 France  Germany  Switzerland  Netherlands  UK  US 
Broadening of deposit insurance    Y  Y    Y  Y 
Capital injections  1.4  0.9  1.1  5.1  3.4  2.1 
Debt guarantees  3.7  5.2  0  6.8  7.2  2.4 
Asset insurance  0.2  0    4.7  33.4  2.5 
Asset purchases    0  7.6      0.3 
Nationalizations   Y    Y  Y  Y 
Source:  Panetta et al. ( 2009, table 1.2) and BIS Annual Report 2009 (table VI.2). Data cover the September 
2008 – June 2009 period. A blank cell (Y) means that the measure was not part of the rescue package (was part 
of it). 0 means that the measure is part of the rescue package but that there was no outlay during the  period 
covered. Figures represent outlays and are given in percentage of GDP. 
A first reason for differences is the divergence in initial situations. In Spain, banks had been 
prevented by the supervisor from buying mortgaged-backed securities and forced to build-up 
strong capital buffers during the housing market boom. They were affected by the collapse of 
housing prices but not by the subprime crisis. In Germany, regional banks had a weaker 
capital base and had invested heavily in structured assets. In the UK, mortgage refinancing by 
short-term borrowing on financial markets had been a flourishing business model that was 
destroyed by the crisis. In emerging economies, banks were hardly exposed to structured 
assets and were only hit by the subsequent economic crisis.  
A second reason lies in the structure of the banking system:  in continental Europe, 
commercial banks with strong deposit bases were dominant, while investment banks led the 
game in the US. 
A third reason has to do with political-economy constraints, which played a major role in 
determining the nature of the responses, both at a national and at an international level: 
  At a national level, there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. By providing 
generous recapitalization with little constraint in terms of governance, or by purchasing 
toxic assets at an inflated price, governments could quickly restore bank solvency and 
encourage private investors to invest in and lend to banks again. But the cost would then 
be borne by the taxpayer, while it should primarily be borne by the bank’s shareholders, 
who had reaped generous revenues in the years before the crisis and had accepted the 
accompanying risk. Alternatively, refraining from rescuing banks, or imposing a large 
cost on shareholders or, worst, on employees, would preserve the taxpayer in the short run 
but might fail to fix the problem, thereby inflating the final cost to the taxpayer. The US 
case illustrates this discussion. The Bush, then Obama administrations had a hard time 
convincing Congress to use taxpayer money to support banks in the midst of a recession, 
and had to limit themselves to the initial 700 billion dollars allocation. As a consequence, 
they did not aim to maximize the return on public cash injections but to maximize the 
effect of injecting a given amount of public cash; 
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  At an international level, the absence of ex-ante arrangements on sharing the fiscal cost of 
bank rescues makes it even more difficult to design them. As Charles Goodhart (2009, 
p.16) has said, “cross-border banks are international in life, but national in death”. In such 
a context, tight international coordination on the supervision of cross-border institutions 
and on bank resolution regimes is called for (see Section 3). 
b.  Unconventional monetary policy 
The Taylor rule can be used to provide a rough benchmark for setting the short-term interest 
rate. A standard formula relates this rate to the “equilibrium” real interest rate, the inflation 
rate and the output gap. Application of this benchmark rule would have resulted in 
significantly negative nominal interest rates in 2009 in the United States, the euro area and 
Japan.  As already stated in Section 1, monetary policy during the crisis thus encountered the 
zero-bound problem:  while the Taylor rule would have recommended a negative interest rate, 
this is not possible to achieve, because asset-holders are not prepared to pay for keeping 
deposits with the banks (they would rather buy safes and keep cash at home).  
In the 1990s, the Japanese experience with deflation and the liquidity trap prompted fresh 
thinking on the options still available when the interest rate cannot be lowered any further. 
The Fed especially studied this episode extensively and reached the conclusion that monetary 
policy could still be used and be effective. This was the origin of what became known as the 
zero interest-rate policy or ZIRP.  
Another reason why unconventional methods are called for in a financial crisis is that the 
traditional transmission of policy rates to lending rates is hampered by the dysfunctional state 
of money markets. This happens at two levels:  first, the interbank rate (the rate at which 
banks lend liquidity to each other) diverges from the central bank’s policy rate because banks 
fearing counterparty default price risk accordingly; second, the spread between the 
commercial banks’ lending rate and the interbank rate increases both because of higher risk 
premiums and because banks seek to increase their profits. Both phenomena were apparent in 
2007-2008 as illustrated by Figure 5 for the UK:  prior to summer 2007 there was barely any 
difference between the BoE policy rate and the interbank rate but the spread widened in 2007-
2008 and reached 175 basis points in autumn 2008; simultaneously, the spread between the 
interbank rate and the banks’ lending rate widened from 80 basis points in summer 2007 to 
160 in spring 2009. The net result was that only four-fifths of the 525 basis points policy rate 
cut was passed on to non-financial agents. Furthermore, quantitative restrictions were 
commonplace as the volume of interbank credit dropped sharply and lending to non-financial 
customers slowed down markedly. So recourse to unconventional methods may be needed 
even before the policy rate hits the zero bound.   40
Figure 5 – Three-month interest rates in the UK, 2006-2009 
(annualized, in percent) 
 
Source:  Bank of England. 
To understand ZIRP it is best to start with a simple thought experiment. Imagine that the 
central bank prints vast amounts of banknotes and drops them above big cities from 
helicopters. Surely, individuals receiving banknotes from heaven would feel suddenly richer 
and would spend at least part of this money (especially if they have heard about monetarism 
and fear that relying on the printing press will in the end result in inflation). Demand would 
pick up and inflation would follow later on with the consequence that the short-term real 
interest rate would decrease, leading to a further increase in demand.  
What this thought experiment demonstrates is that the central bank’s exclusive power to 
create money remains effective whatever the interest rate level and the state of money 
markets. Despite the fact that it does not provide actual means to conduct monetary policy, it 
gives indications about what it can be. Surely, there must be more practicable ways to channel 
money to private agents than dropping banknotes from helicopters. Policy thinking about 
unconventional policies was still fragmentary when the crisis hit (there had been debates and 
reflections about the Japanese experience but no systematic doctrine had been formulated, let 
alone a generally accepted definition of unconventional policy). Several approaches and 
partially overlapping concepts were therefore put forward in 2007-2008 (Bernanke, 2009 and 
King, 2009 provide practitioners’ rationalizations. Meier, 2009, gives a systematic account of 
the evidence).  
The large-scale provision of liquidity to financial institutions, beyond the scale of normal 
operation of the discount window, is arguably more an adaptation of standard central-bank 
practice than a genuinely unconventional policy. Starting in summer 2007, all central banks  41
extended wholesale liquidity to domestic financial agents. At an international level, liquidity 
provision also involved swap agreements between central banks such as those entered into by 
the Fed with partner central banks in developed and emerging countries (Box 9). Such 
agreements served a useful purpose to supply banking systems with US dollars, while 
highlighting the lack of international coordination of last-resort liquidity provision (Obstfeld, 
2009), an issue we will address in Section 3. 
The reason why, although truly exceptional, such initiatives do not fundamentally depart from 
standard monetary policy, is that they essentially aim at substituting the interbank market 
when it is clogged. Although they result in an increase in the size of the balance sheet of the 
central bank, they may leave constant the amount of money held by non-financial agents. In 
other words, the supply of base money (the central bank’s balance sheet) has to increase 
because the ratio of money held by the public to base money (the money multiplier) has 
dropped due to reduced credit extended by commercial banks. This is what the Fed had failed 
to grasp during the Great Depression, thereby aggravating the crisis. Central banks this time 
fully offset the drop in the multiplier, without actually increasing money held by financial 
agents (von Hagen, 2009). 
Box 9 – International swap agreements 
Swap agreements entered into by major central banks enable partner central banks to provide commercial banks 
and other financial market participants with liquidity in foreign currency that they cannot obtain on the market 
anymore.  
A currency swap is a contract between two parties to exchange an asset in one currency for an asset of equal 
value denominated in another currency. When the Fed enters into a swap agreement with the ECB it supplies the 
latter with US dollars and takes an equivalent amount of euros in exchange. Swaps are entered into for a time-
bound period. 
In autumn 2008 existing US Federal Reserve swap agreements with the ECB, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank 
of England and the Bank of Japan were adjusted to unlimited amounts and new swap lines were extended to the 
central banks of Brazil, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore.
a The Fed’s intention was to make sure that 
financial market participants operating in dollars on non-US markets could access dollar liquidity in spite of the 
clogging of interbank markets. The amount drawn by partner central banks peaked at 600 billion dollars in 
December 2008 (Figure 9.1). 
In Europe the Swedish central bank has entered into similar agreements with partners in Iceland and in central 
and eastern Europe (Latvia and Estonia). The ECB has remained more cautious:  it has established swap lines 
with central banks in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland but not with countries of central and eastern Europe. 
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Figure 9.1 – US dollars provided through swap lines by the ECB and the Fed, 
in US billions 
 
Source:  ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2009. 
aThe Fed also has swap lines with central banks in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
According to Meier (2009), genuinely unconventional policies involve two types of actions: 
•  Announcements and / or refinancing operations designed to affect the yield curve at 
longer-than-usual horizons;  
•  Outright asset purchases, generally known as quantitative easing or credit easing, to 
reduce the spread between interbank and lending rates.  
Central banks normally only target the short end of the yield curve, leaving the determination 
of longer-term interest rates to market mechanisms. In a situation of near-deflation, however, 
expectations of positive interest rates and very low or negative inflation may combine to fuel 
a deflationary spiral. For this reason central banks can commit to keep policy rates low for an 
extended period and enter into refinancing operations with extend maturity, possibly at a fixed 
rate and with unlimited amounts, thereby imposing a ceiling on interest rates at the 
corresponding horizon. This may imply committing, implicitly or explicitly, to higher 
inflation in the future, in order to lower expected real interest rates and encourage borrowing 
and investment.  
These techniques, first suggested by Paul Krugman (1998a) and then-scholar (and later 
central bank governor in Cyprus) Athanasios Orphanides (2004) in the context of the 
Japanese crisis, have been used to varying extents by central banks, though none has gone as 
far as following Krugman’s prescription and “committing to being irresponsible”. For 
example, the US Federal Open Market Committee’s statement of August 2009 included, as in 
previous months, the announcement that “the Committee continues to anticipate that 
economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate 
for an extended period”. The ECB used a different channel to lengthen the agents’ horizon:  in 
June 2009 it provided 12-month collateralized loans to the banks at a fixed 1% rate and for an 
unlimited amount (ex post, the banks’ borrowing amounted to about 5% of GDP), but without 
committing to a repeat of this transaction.  43
Rather than aiming at affecting the overall yield curve through expectations of future rates, 
the central bank can directly affect yields on certain categories of assets through outright 
purchases. These can be either debt instruments issued by non-financial agents or government 
bonds. The rationale here can be to unfreeze clogged segments of financial markets, to help 
non-financial agents to get access to better and cheaper credit, and to affect long-term bond 
rates directly.  
Meier (2009) provides a categorization of such operations, distinguishing between qualitative 
easing (sterilized interventions that do not involve an increase in the central bank’s balance 
sheet) and quantitative easing (unsterilized interventions implying an increase in base money). 
Table 3 summarizes these various options and indicates what major central banks actually 
engaged in. The ECB stands apart for not contemplating quantitative easing (although its 
purchase of covered bonds may not be sterilized entirely, the amounts potentially involved are 
a mere 0.6% of GDP). The BoE, the BoJ and the Fed engaged in significant quantitative 
easing with announced amounts of 8.6%, 5.2% and 14.7% of GDP respectively. Finally, the 
Swiss National Bank stands out as the one that relied on unsterilized currency intervention. 
 
Table 3 - Categories of unconventional monetary policy operations involving asset 
purchases  
  No expansion of base money 
(qualitative easing) 
Expansion of base money 
(quantitative easing) 
Purchase of private assets 
(credit easing) 
ECB  BoE, BoJ, Fed, SNB 
Purchase of government bonds    BoE, BoJ, Fed 
Purchase of foreign-currency 
assets (forex intervention) 
  SNB 
Source:  Meier (2009), on the basis of announcements made by end-June 2009. 
Direct purchases of government bonds have a special status as they break the separation 
between monetary policy and fiscal policy and evoke debt monetization. They can be an 
effective tool when short-term interest rates are close to zero and longer-term rates well into 
positive territory:  government bond purchases can be effective in flattening the yield curve, 
which benefits all long-run borrowers, including corporations and foreign borrowers. Still, 
such a policy is normally taboo as it comes close to a direct financing of the government by 
the central bank – hence a monetization of the public debt as feared by Sargent and Wallace. 
In the euro area, for example, the provision by central banks of credit facilities to 
governments or the direct purchase of government debt instruments are prohibited by Art 101 
of the EC Treaty.
25 This taboo was broken in the US and the UK, as it was in Japan in the 
early 2000s. 
                                                 
25   This is somewhat hypocritical since the Eurosystem does purchase European government bonds for 
investment purposes (on the secondary market and in limited amounts), and since there is little economic  44
Overall, liquidity provision and unconventional policies resulted in an unprecedented increase 
in the size of the central banks’ balance sheets (Figure 6). In Spring 2009, assets held by the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England were more than twice as high as in spring 2007, and 
they were about 50% higher for the ECB. 
Unconventional policies are necessary in exceptional circumstances, but they are not without 
risks: 
  The direct inflation risk is less significant than often argued. The expansion of base 
money does not in itself create an inflation risk if it is undertaken in response to a 
reduction in the money multiplier. It can be reversed easily in response to a revival of 
direct interbank lending. Exceptional liquidity provision does not imply a more 
expansionary monetary policy; 
  Through liquidity provision, the composition of central banks’ assets has been massively 
skewed towards riskier assets. In principle, central banks apply an appropriate haircut 
(discount) to the collateral they take in order to account for the risk. Furthermore, the 
collateral remains the property of the banks and only serves as a guarantee for the central 
bank’s loan. However in times of crisis the frontier between liquidity provision and 
subsidization is a thin one and - if, for example, the risk is not adequately priced or if the 
market for the assets taken as collateral is paralyzed - the central bank can de facto 
become a quasi-fiscal agent, in effect blurring the distinction between monetary and 
budgetary policies. In particular, a loss on the assets bought by central banks could 
necessitate an intervention of the Treasury to recapitalize it, thus endangering its 
independence; 
  Commitments that affect the yield curve beyond the usual very short-term horizon, or 
assets purchases that have the same goal, may involve an inflation risk. For the central 
bank, committing credibly to keeping interest rates at near-zero levels for an extended 
period amounts by definition to taking an inflation risk. This may be the price to pay for 
lowering ex-ante real interest rates; 
  By the same token, such policies break with the tradition that only the very short end of 
the yield curve is policy-determined and that the rest of it is market-determined. This may 
at a later stage make it difficult to return to a policy of non-intervention in the formation 
of medium and long-term interest rates. 
                                                                                                                                                          
difference between an outright purchase of a government bond and a liquidity tender with the same bond used as 
collateral, which can be rolled over as many times as needed.  45
Figure 6 - Total assets of selected central banks, 2007-2009 
 
Source:  IMF. 
c.  Large-scale discretionary fiscal stimulus 
Prior to the crisis the effectiveness of fiscal policy was the subject of fierce debate. In the 
European Union, conventional wisdom was that countercyclical fiscal policy was useful but 
should only rely on automatic stabilizers. Due to implementation delays and/or political 
cycles, discretionary fiscal policy was not considered an effective stabilization instrument. On 
each of the three criteria of flexibility, speed of action and reversibility, it was outperformed 
by monetary policy. Even within the euro area where monetary policy was no longer available 
to respond to country-specific shocks, automatic stabilizers were considered large enough to 
stabilize country-specific shocks, provided public accounts were kept ‘close to balance or in 
surplus’ in the medium run and were allowed to exceed the 3% deficit threshold in case of 
‘exceptional circumstances’. This explains why, when the crisis hit, many were not at ease 
with the very principle of a fiscal stimulus. Prominent policy-makers such as Jean-Claude 
Juncker, the president of the Eurogroup, kept insisting that “you cannot fight debt with new 
debt and deficits with new deficits”.
26 
Yet, unlike monetary policy, government demand for goods directly affects spending, thereby 
complementing rather than stimulating private demand. It can therefore be especially effective 
in situations when monetary policy effectiveness is hampered by a series of obstacles. 
Furthermore, in time of deep recession, many of the usual counter-arguments to discretionary 
fiscal policy do not apply: 
                                                 
26   Financial Times, 4 April 2009.   46
  The magnitude of the drop in demand implies that there is virtually an excess supply of all 
goods and services in all countries and that inflation is decreasing. As a consequence, the 
supply curve can be considered flat (i.e. the supply can increase without any upward 
pressure on prices), the traditional crowding out effects on investment and trade do not 
apply; 
  As financial markets are dysfunctional, private agents are not able to borrow freely and 
engage in intertemporal optimization. More of them are liquidity constrained, as in the 
textbook Keynesian model; 
  With unlimited credit supply by the central bank, there is no risk that public borrowing 
crowds out private borrowing; 
  Cross-country externalities, whose signs are ambiguous under normal conditions, turn 
positive because spillovers through product markets dominate spillovers through capital 
markets.  
In other words the macroeconomic conditions at end-2008 when the stimulus programmes 
were launched were exactly those in which discretionary fiscal policy could be expected to be 
effective – provided that funds were disbursed swiftly enough. This was recognized by long-
time advocates of fiscal policy ineffectiveness:   
“Under normal circumstances, I would oppose this rise in the budget deficit and the 
higher level of government spending. When an economy is closer to full employment, 
government borrowing to finance budget deficits can crowd out private investment that 
would raise productivity and the standard of living. Budget deficits automatically 
increase government debt, requiring higher future taxes to pay the interest on that debt. 
The resulting higher tax rates distort economic incentives and thus weaken future 
economic performance.... Nevertheless, I support the use of fiscal stimulus in the US, 
because the current recession is much deeper than and different from previous 
downturns.” Martin Feldstein (2009). 
In Europe in November 2008, governments and the European Commission engineered an 
exceptional coordinated stimulus of about 1.5% of GDP. At about the same time the IMF 
advocated a 2% of GDP stimulus in all countries in a position to engage in such an action. In 
the US, the Obama administration introduced a two-year package amounting to 787 billion 
dollars shortly after taking office in January 2009. China also announced a massive stimulus 
programme. As the whole, the IMF (2009a) estimated in the spring of 2009 that G-20 
countries would provide a discretionary impulse of 0.5% of GDP in 2008 and 1.2% in 2009.  47
Figure 7 - Size and composition of fiscal stimulus plans in the EU15 
 
Source:  European Commission (2009). 
As regards the composition of the stimulus (Figure 7), many countries put emphasis on public 
investment (both infrastructure building and incentives to private investment, especially 
“green” investments). The idea was to maximize the Keynesian multiplier and increase public 
assets simultaneously with public debts (so that net public debt would not rise too much). 
However there are often delays in the implementation of public investment plans. For 
instance, the US Congressional Budget Office calculated in June 2009 that US expenditures 
on infrastructure building within the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed in 
February 2009 would peak in 2010 and 2011.
27 Conversely, some countries such as the UK 
relied primarily on tax cuts, which are very rapid to implement but may not translate into 
higher demand if private agents choose to save or, in the case of the British VAT cut, may 
result in limited pass-through on prices if competition conditions allow suppliers of goods and 
services to retain the benefit of the cut. Additionally, tax cuts may be politically difficult to 
reverse. 
Not all governments and central banks were able to turn expansionary. Central and eastern 
European countries were hit by ‘sudden stops’ of capital inflows that forced them to reduce 
domestic demand through fiscal retrenchment and a tight monetary policy, even though they 
were supported by IMF and EU loans.
28 Developing countries which had resisted the crisis but 
which could no longer borrow from international markets were encouraged to carry out 
countercyclical fiscal policies with the financial support of multilateral and bilateral 
                                                 
27   China did not experience such a delay because many infrastructure projects had been halted before the 
crisis when the government was aiming to slow down the economy. These were ready to be implemented when 
the crisis arose. 
28   The countries on a fixed-peg regime also chose to defend their exchange rates through high interest 
rates.  48
development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
29 and some of 
them were awarded the newly created ‘flexible credit line’ by the IMF, a contingent financing 
facility. IMF-subsidized loans to low-income countries were doubled. This was the first time 
official financing was extended as a support to countercyclical policies. More broadly, for the 
first time, the IMF vocally advocated large fiscal stimulus and bank rescue plans.
30 
Reliance on large-scale stimulus, coming on top of the cost of large-scale bank bailouts and of 
the recession-induced fall in tax receipts, led to a sharp increase in public debt ratios 
(Figure 8). 
Figure 8 - Gross public debt ratios in selected countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source:  European Commission spring forecasts, May 2009. 
The Irish case is especially dramatic since the tripling of the gross-debt ratio was 
accompanied by public guarantees extended to banks which were worth 200% of GDP. This 
case is by no means exceptional, though. Again, experience from past crises is unequivocal. 
The Japanese gross public-debt ratio rose from 64% in 1991 to 175% in 2005 as a 
consequence of the financial crisis and a series of stimulus packages (see also Box 7). More 
generally, financial crises have been found to have large-scale consequences on public debt 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a,b). 
Bond markets started at the end of 2008 to discriminate more between euro area sovereign 
borrowers, while rating agencies downgraded several of them. These moves in part reflected 
an across-the-board re-pricing of risk after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, in part a general 
lack of liquidity which favored the most liquid debts, such as Germany and France, but in part 
also genuine sustainability concerns over public-finance sustainability in specific countries. 
                                                 
29   The International Financing Corporation (a branch of the World Bank group) and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development also provided direct support to private sectors in developing countries, e.g. 
by providing fresh capital to banks. 
30   See, for instance, Blanchard et al. (2008).  49
Such concern was especially worrying for members of the euro area, which have lost the 
ability to monetize public debts. In countries with independent currencies such as in the 
United States, the concern over debt sustainability rapidly changed into a concern over 
inflation in the medium run. These two opposite cases can be seen as potential illustrations of 
the ‘game of chicken’ depicted in the ‘unpleasant monetary arithmetics’ model of Sargent and 
Wallace (Box 4.11):  in countries in a monetary union, fiscal policy would give in to 
monetary policy while the opposite would hold for countries with independent monetary 
policies. 
To prevent such unpleasant outcomes while providing the required budgetary support in the 
short run, two-handed policies are called for:  they need at the same time to sustain significant 
spending programmes as long as the recovery is not solidly under way and to ensure 
sustainability in the medium run through credible commitments to reverse course in the 
medium run and bring public finances back to balance. In fact, analysis of the requirements of 
fiscal-policy effectiveness suggests that the more sustainability is guaranteed for the medium 
run, the more stimulus packages are effective in the short run. So there is no contradiction but 
rather complementarity between providing Keynesian support and adhering to fiscal 
discipline. Still, such discipline is difficult to define in a credible way in the midst of a crisis. 
We will come back to this challenge in the next section. 
2.2.  The aftermath 
a.  Exit strategies 
Exceptional challenges require exceptional responses, with the risk of building up distortions 
and disequilibria calling for later adjustment. There are many examples:  consolidation in the 
banking sector may hamper competition, inflated central-bank balance sheets may undermine 
confidence in price stability, stimulus packages and guarantees extended to the private sector 
may lead to an unsustainable build-up of public debt. Such concerns are of second order in the 
midst of the crisis but they gain prominence along the recovery path. 
The exit strategy issue raises difficult and related questions as to when, to what extent, at what 
pace and in what order to unwind the unorthodox macroeconomic and financial policies 
undertaken in response to the crisis.  
  Rather than being time-contingent, exit strategies must be state-contingent. Public 
participation in the capital of banks and other support measures need to be maintained as 
long as banks remain too fragile to elicit confidence in capital markets. The experience of 
past crises shows that budgetary and monetary support should be sustained as long as the 
recovery has not gained sufficient autonomous traction. Earlier mistakes are telling:  in 
1936, the Fed severely tightened monetary policy by raising reserve requirements in order 
to check the expansion of credit. This killed the recovery that had started in 1933 and led 
to the 1937-38 economic contraction
31. Japan also experienced a failed exit in 1997 (see 
below). Finding the right timing for policy reversal may, however, be tricky when the 
impact of the crisis on potential output is uncertain (see the discussion below on the 
                                                 
31   For an account, see Friedman and Schwartz (1963). See also Kroszner  (2009).   50
legacy of the crisis). If potential output has been lastingly dented by the crisis, then the 
output gap is smaller in absolute value. There is less need for demand stimulation and 
more need for supply-oriented reforms, without which inflationary pressures may build up 
sooner than expected; 
 
  There is little debate over the need for fiscal policy to get back to normality. But not all 
support measures can be easily reversed and there is a risk of ending up with a 
permanently higher level of public expenditure. As regards monetary policy, while 
wholesale liquidity support needs to be unwound, the very definition of the objectives and 
operational guidelines of policy is bound to be modified by the crisis. So there is for sure 
an exit, but not exactly to the status quo ante. This is even truer for the micro- 
interventions:  exit from government ownership requires that regulation be reformed and 
reinforced. Hence, a successful exit strategy is not a reversal to the ex-ante policy 
framework.  
 
  Finally, the sequencing question is the most daunting challenge. In principle it is advisable 
to start by removing the most distortionary components of the rescue packages, i.e. their 
micro-components, then remove the fiscal support (as it involves significant costs to 
public finances) and finally remove the monetary support. However political-economy 
considerations suggest the reverse order is more likely, because central banks will be keen 
on getting back on track, and governments will be willing and under pressure to limit the 
rise in public debt, whereas pressures to retain pervasive state intervention in the financial 
sector may remain strong – at least in countries where banks have political clout. 
Exiting also means ending the confusion of roles between monetary and fiscal policies. As 
already mentioned, central banks have inflated (sometimes doubled or tripled) their balance 
sheets during the crisis and skewed their composition towards riskier assets. Ending implicit 
monetary subsidization requires recognizing potential losses on central banks’ balances sheets 
and, when needed, presenting the bill to taxpayers.  
Finally, there are issues of international cooperation. Countries may exit the recession at a 
different pace depending on their initial situation, policy responses and exposures to the 
global shock. This calls for differentiated exit strategies – except where the crisis response 
affects internationally integrated market segments. This obviously applies to intervention on 
international capital markets (such as central-bank purchase of bonds and other securities) but 
also to government support to highly competitive sectors such as the car industry. Europe is a 
special case:  for example, early fiscal adjustment in a country may hamper the recovery of its 
partners; conversely, lack of adjustment in a large country or group of countries may lead to 
higher interest rates and exert negative externalities. By the same token, restoring a level 
playing field in the banking sector will require ending public support in a coordinated manner.  
b.  The legacy  
International experience with financial crises suggests that there is a high risk of permanent 
potential output reduction. At a first stage the sudden fall in output translates into 
bankruptcies, a rise in unemployment as well as workers exiting the labor market, and lower  51
capital expenditures translating into a lower capital stock. Depending on economic institutions 
and on policies implemented in the aftermath of the crisis, the shock may in turn result in a 
permanently lower employment rate or a permanently lower stock of capital and technologies. 
Post-crisis policies should aim to limit the extent of this permanent damage. 
 
Potential output 
Returning to pre-crisis GDP levels requires several years of growth:  three years on average 
for the industrialized countries that experienced major financial shocks in recent times – 
Finland (1991), Japan (1997), Korea (1997) and Sweden (1991) (Figure 9). In these cases, the 
recovery was largely driven by productivity gains,
32 whereas employment lagged behind. In 
Finland, the unemployment rate of males jumped from 3.5% in 1990 to 7.9% in 1991. It 
peaked at 17.9% in 1993 and 1994 and was still 9% ten years after the beginning of the crisis, 
according to the OECD. Hence, while GDP recovered relatively quickly, the crisis had a long-
lasting effect on unemployment. This illustrates the risk of hysteresis of high-unemployment 
periods:  in the process idle workers lose some of their skills or they cannot update them; 
those near the retirement age withdraw from the labor market; and the crisis first wipes out 
weaker industries, potentially aggravating low-skill worker unemployment. 
 
Figure 9 - GDP profile through financial crises:  Finland, Japan, Korea and Sweden 
Average of four countries; 100 = level on the first year of crisis 
 
Source :  Pisani-Ferry and Van Pottelsberghe (2009) on the basis of national data. 
The crisis will have lasting effects on the financial industry. Fewer actors and therefore less 
competition in the banking sector compounded with higher regulatory capital requirements 
will translate into higher borrowing costs, hence less investment and lower potential output. 
Risk-aversion may be durably higher, which may be helpful to prevent similar crises 
                                                 
32   The increase in GDP per hour worked evidenced by Figure 8.12 can be partly due to a composition 
effect, since low-productivity workers are the first victims of a recession.  52
occuring, but detrimental to venture capital in innovative industries. Fluid capital markets are 
key to ensuring factor reallocation and risk-sharing in the innovation process; pre-crisis 
capital markets may have been too fluid, but a clogged financial system will not help either. If 
this is compensated by tougher supervision and higher capital requirements, one result of the 
crisis would be higher capital costs, hence slower capital accumulation. 
In some countries a shrinking financial sector could in itself reduce potential output. In 
Ireland, for instance, financial intermediation represented 10% of GDP in 2005.
33 Before 
production factors are reallocated to other sectors, a 20% reduction in value added in this 
sector would thus translate into a 2% fall in potential output. Additionally, the pace of 
potential output may have been overestimated during the pre-crisis boom, for instance due to 
overinvestment. Hence, in Ireland GDP may not recover its pre-crisis level for many years. 
The ability to reallocate labor and capital will be essential in order to limit the permanent 
consequences of the crisis. If successful, such reallocation could in principle increase 
potential output in the medium term (this is Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’). 
Traditionally, Anglo-Saxon countries are more successful than those of continental Europe in 
reallocating labor across sectors and also geographically. The high unemployment in 
continental Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s has been ascribed to the interaction of adverse 
shocks and rigid labor market institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In these countries, 
further labor-market reforms will therefore be needed to bring unemployment rates back to 
their pre-crisis levels. The problem is that structural reforms are costly in the short run and 
may be politically difficult to implement in the aftermath of a crisis. Finally, large-scale 
reallocation of capital to new industries necessitates well-functioning financial markets and 
banks. It may be hampered by convalescent, more risk-adverse banks. This is why some 
forms of active, internationally coordinated industrial policy may temporarily be needed. 
Public debt 
Already burdened with inflated debts, governments will still face the cost of ageing, a cost 
that itself has been magnified by the crisis. The net cost of ageing for public finances is still 
valued at several percentage points of GDP.
34 Parametric reforms of pension systems such as 
longer working periods are necessary. 
This already existing challenge is compounded by the effects of the crisis. First, according to 
the IMF (2009b), the loss incurred by US and UK pension funds in 2008 amounts to 22 and 
31% of GDP, respectively (excluding losses on toxic assets). Depending on how financial 
markets recover, there will be effects on public finances, both direct (because of unbalanced 
public pension funds or public bail-outs of private schemes) and indirect (through pressures 
for more generous pensions from the pay-as-you-go pillars to compensate for the reduction of 
funded pensions, and higher unemployment among older workers, making pension reforms 
more difficult to engineer). Second, lower potential output makes it even more difficult to 
consolidate public finances. Let us suppose that industrialized countries have permanently lost 
                                                 
33   Source:  EUKLEMS database, 2005 figure. The same year, financial intermediation represented 25% of 
GDP in Luxembourg, 8% in the UK and in the Netherlands, but only 2% in Finland. 
34   Equivalent to an increase in the fiscal deficit of 2.9% of GDP from 2005 to 2050 in the United States, 
3.4% in the United Kingdom, 3.8% in Australia, 7.7% in Canada and up to 13.4% in Korea (see IMF, 2009b).  53
5% of potential GDP as a result of the crisis (an arbitrary guess, but of the right order of 
magnitude). With government revenues amounting to around 35% of GDP, this implies a 
permanent revenue loss equivalent to 1.75% of potential GDP, hence a structural deficit 
which is permanently higher by the same amount. In plain English, the fiscal hurdle is now 
much higher. Lastly, and in addition to the previous mechanisms, lower growth speeds up 
debt accumulation by increasing the fiscal surplus required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP 
ratio
35.  
Globalization 
Finally, the post-crisis world will have to cope with possible ‘de-globalization’ and rising 
protectionist tensions.  
The sharp drop in trade in goods and services observed in late 2008 and early 2009 can be 
explained by the fall in world output, the shift of global demand away from capital goods 
(that happen to be traded more than consumption goods), the shortage of trade finance and 
relative price effects.
36  Despite anecdotal evidence of rising tariff or non-tariff barriers, 
genuine protectionism has not emerged as a response to the crisis (in contrast to the 1930s). 
Nevertheless, a failure of governments to curb unemployment could later on give rise to 
serious protectionist pressures that could significantly affect the globalization process at work 
during the 1990s and 2000s. Additionally, a sustained recovery of world growth will be much 
dependent on the ability of large, emerging countries to substitute for the US as a world 
growth engine. This means less outward-oriented growth models. For instance, China would 
need to lower its savings rate and develop its domestic market
37.  
On the financial side, large cross-border financial institutions will be less fashionable, since 
they are difficult to supervise and even more difficult to close when they go bankrupt. Small 
countries will be more reluctant to host them, given the cost of a rescue in terms of their own 
GDP (the ‘too-big-to-save’ syndrome). Also, the crisis has led to a dramatic reduction in 
cross-border investments (Figure 10). Developing countries have been especially hurt. 
Reviving international capital flows and recreating North-South and South-South flows to 
finance development will be a major challenge. For this purpose, emerging countries could 
diversify their foreign-currency holdings out of US Treasury bills and into ‘strategic’ 
investments in energy, agriculture, manufacturing and finance, using sovereign wealth funds 
as their instruments. This would be consistent with their climb up the quality ladder and the 
adjustment of their production structure. Such a transition would however require a large 
exchange-rate adjustment and may raise protectionist concerns in developed countries. 
 
 
                                                 
35   Adverse debt dynamics can be mitigated to some extent by lower interest rates as a result of higher 
savings. 
36   See Bénassy-Quéré, Decreux,Fontagné and Khoudour-Castéras (2009). 
37   This means not only the reconstruction of social safety nets (to make it possible for households to save 
less), but also more incentives for domestic entrepreneurs to work for the domestic market (e.g. a halt to tax 
incentives for exports and a more robust legal framework for business domestically) and increased incentives for 
domestic banks to lend to domestic entrepreneurs rather than (as they have been doing again under the fiscal 
stimulus plan) to lend primarily to public enterprises and local governments.  54
Figure 10 - Financial de-globalization 
 
*Sum of assets invested abroad and foreign-owned assets of the largest 30 countries by portfolio volume. 
Source:  Broda et al. (2009). 
2.3.  Lessons 
Before the crisis, policy discussion in advanced economies tended to favor rules over 
discretion, to downplay the role of fiscal policy as a way to stimulate aggregate demand and 
to refrain from interfering with market signals. In sharp contrast, governments during the 
crisis held policy rules in abeyance, engineered massive bank rescues and industry-level 
support (such as in the car sector), launched fiscal stimulus plans and took direct control of 
entire segments of the economy. As for central banks, they promptly played their role as 
lenders of last resort, brought refinancing rates to zero and embarked upon previously 
untested unconventional monetary easing. 
This course of action proved highly successful in comparison with the Great Depression – at 
least in the short run. The long run consequences are not yet tested. 
The crisis has shown the importance of economic policy rules going together with escape 
clauses that allow policy-makers to revert to discretion in exceptional times. But it may also 
leave its imprint on the rules themselves. To provide but a few examples: the Stability and 
Growth Pact will not rein in government deficits in Europe without additional rules to cope 
with the higher cost of ageing, and the crisis has re-opened the debate on asset prices and 
monetary policy rules. The shape of the post-crisis world is the subject of the next section. 
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3.  IN SEARCH OF A NEW REGIME 
We have analyzed in Section 1 why the crisis can be attributed to microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors, as well as to a lack of resilience of the system as a whole. We have 
described in Section 2 the immediate reaction of policy-makers to its outbreak. We now turn 
to the global reform agenda, that is, to the changes that are needed to reduce the risk of similar 
crises in the future. 
This agenda was first defined in a series of meetings of the G-20 leaders. In an unprecedented 
exercise of international coordination they met in Washington, London and Pittsburgh 
(Pennsylvania) in 2008 and 2009.
38 While a large part of these meetings was devoted to crisis 
management and financial regulatory reform, the reform of international financial institutions 
and the creation of a framework for international coordination ranked high on the agenda in 
order to “lay the foundation for reform to help to ensure that a global crisis, such as this one, 
does not happen again.
39” Specialized institutions such as the BIS, the IMF or the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) actively participated in the search for a better international financial 
and macroeconomic system.  
This section presents the steps taken during these hectic times and discusses those that are still 
a matter for debate. We begin with the financial system and continue with the macroeconomic 
and monetary policy regime before introducing a number of policy issues that are being 
debated among academics but are not (or not yet) part of the policy agenda. 
3.1.  The financial system 
As explained in Section 1, the crisis revealed four major failures of the financial system: 
-  Excess confidence in self-regulation and a lack of regulation of some financial 
institutions (special investment vehicles, hedge funds…); 
-  Ill-designed regulation leading to excessive risk-taking and procyclical behavior; 
-  Gaps in financial infrastructures (e.g. lack of organized credit default-swap markets) 
and institutions (e.g. a lack of preparation for bank failures, especially cross-border 
bank failures; 
-  The lack of a systemic view of financial vulnerabilities. 
Solutions were suggested to tackle each of these various failures of the system at the national, 
regional and international levels. 
a.  Close the gaps in regulation 
                                                 
38   The scope and intensity on international coordination contrasts starkly with the response given to the 
crisis in the 1930s. Then, the one major attempt to organize a common response, the London conference of 1933, 
ended in disagreement, not least because Franklin Roosevelt deliberately torpedoed it. 
39   Declaration of the Washington summit, November 2008.    56
“We all agree that at the heart of the modern enterprise challenge is minimising 
regulatory concerns […] The better, and in my opinion the correct, modern model of 
regulation – the risk-based approach - is based on trust in the responsible company, the 
engaged employee and the educated consumer, leading government to focus its attention 
where it should:  no inspection without justification, no form-filling without justification, 
and no information requirements without justification, not just a light touch but a limited 
touch.” UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown speech at the Confederation of British 
Industry, 28 November 2005. 
“No longer can we allow Wall Street wrongdoers to slip through regulatory cracks. No 
longer can we allow special interests to put their thumbs on the economic scales.” 
President-elect Barack Obama (2009). 
Prior to the crisis, regulation was often regarded as a hindrance to business and international 
competitiveness, and great trust was put in self-regulation. Examples of such confidence can 
be found in the Basel II capital standards, which partially rely on in-house assessment of risks 
(see Box 2), in the loopholes in banking supervision (such as the shadow banking system and 
US mortgage originators), in the high leverage ratios investment banks were allowed to 
maintain in spite of capital requirements, or in the leniency of regulators vis-à-vis the credit-
rating agencies, whose performance was not monitored and whose conflicts of interest were 
not addressed.
40 These are only examples.  
One clear manifestation of self-regulation failure, noted by Persaud (2009), was that, prior to 
the crisis, the equity of banks that were either bailed out or bankrupted during the crisis such 
as Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Fortis and Lehman Brothers, exhibited higher price-earnings 
ratios than those of more resilient banks such as HSBC or JP Morgan-Chase. The risks taken 
by the former group of banks were apparently not priced in. 
Regulatory loopholes are probably the most straightforward root of the crisis. Banks escaped 
capital regulations by using off-balance-sheet special investment vehicles (SIVs) to buy asset-
backed securities while financing these investments through short-term asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABSs). However, the corresponding risk was not transferred since banks 
extended guarantees to their SIVs, or even held asset-backed securities while transferring 
their loans to SIVs in order to reduce on-balance-sheet risk. In brief, this is as if banks 
themselves had bought ABSs without capital. When in the wake of the crisis the short-run 
funding dried up, ABSs (then called ‘toxic assets’) had to be transferred back to banks’ 
balance sheets, where capital requirements apply, leading to sudden undercapitalization of the 
banking sector and to the subsequent disruptions in financial markets.
41 
Having understood the responsibility of regulatory gaps in the crisis, policy-makers soon 
declared their intention to regulate all significant financial actors and markets. Advocates of 
free markets objected that bureaucrats are ill-placed to know what is good for the market and 
that there was a risk that excess regulation would hinder innovation and growth. However this 
objection can be circumvented by (i) delegating supervision and oversight to independent, 
technically able specialized agencies, and (ii) retaining elements of self-regulation in the 
                                                 
40   Credit-rating agencies were not subject to regulation in the EU and had only to be registered in the US. 
41   Acharya and Richardson (2009).  57
standard-setting process, while giving responsibility for enforcement to independent 
supervisors.
42 
Closing the gaps in regulation requires comprehensive reform of the financial regulatory 
architecture, such as that proposed in 2008 in India by a reform committee chaired by former 
IMF chief economist Raghuram Rajan, in the US by the Treasury Department (Department of 
the Treasury, 2009), and in the European Union by the De Larosière report, subsequently 
endorsed by the European Council (De Larosière, 2009). One way to proceed has been to 
address regulatory fragmentation, which favors regulatory competition both within national 
borders (e.g. in the US) and across countries (e.g. in the European Union): 
-  In the US, as many as five institutions – the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency and the Securities and Exchange Commission - were responsible for banking 
supervision. Fragmentation favored regulatory arbitrage, especially as agencies were 
competing with each other for business. This number has been reduced to three (the Fed, 
the FDIC and the new National Bank Supervisor) in the Obama reform proposals of 2009; 
-  In the EU, cross-border institutions were supervised by banking supervisors, market 
regulators and insurance regulators of all 27 member states. Following the De Larosière 
report, legislation is being considered that would transform existing committees of 
supervisors into three EU-wide bodies with extensive responsibilities. 
In the decades before the crisis, international regulatory competition had become widespread, 
resulting in less regulation. Attracting financial business was an integral part of 
competitiveness policies in a country like the UK, where light-touch regulation was viewed as 
a way to create and attract jobs. This logic was pushed to the extreme in regulatory havens, or 
non-cooperative jurisdictions, i.e. countries or territories which operate a financial industry 
and do not enforce the standards produced by IOSCO or the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. In the aftermath of the crisis, G-20 countries agreed to put pressure on these 
countries.
43 
Regulatory coordination also helps contain regulatory (and supervisory) capture. National 
authorities may be excessively lenient towards domestic institutions, either because they favor 
national champions or because of a blurring of political and business interests. The case of 
France, where political elites often push expansion of domestic banks in the name of the 
national interest; of Germany, where politicians sit on the boards of Landesbanken; or of 
Italy, where central bank governor Antonio Fazio was forced to resign in 2005 after it became 
clear that he had used financial stability arguments to protect the business interest of certain 
                                                 
42   Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are an example of such an approach. Following extensive consultation 
with the industry, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has elaborated a code of 
conduct for CRAs to address conflict of interest between investor information and credit structuring advice, and 
to ensure transparency of rating performance. CRAs now have to register with the market regulator, and they 
will be de-registered if they do not comply with the IOSCO code of conduct. 
43   Although the two concepts partially overlap, regulatory havens should not be confused with tax havens. 
The G-20 also took fierce measures against the latter, but the rationale there was to repatriate tax bases at a time 
when tax receipts were experiencing a steep fall.  58
Italian banks, all show that such practices are a fact of life. International regulatory 
harmonization and cooperation helps limit their extent.  
There will always remain free riders. Contrary to rogue nuclear states, some of them have 
good excuses:  offshore finance is sometimes their only specialization. A way out of this 
problem is to blend cooperation and incentives, e.g. through internationally sponsored 
technical assistance to improve their regulatory capacities and to help them change their 
model, and of suasion, e.g. by making it more costly for international banks to do business in 
recalcitrant territories. 
A related, though not identical, problem is the assignment of supervisory responsibility. 
Banks are generally supervised by the authorities of the country where they are 
headquartered, at least when they operate through branches and not legally independent 
subsidiaries. But financial stability is the responsibility of host-country authorities. It has 
therefore been suggested that responsibility for supervision should switch from home to host 
country. This would require banks to operate through subsidiaries rather than branches, with 
each subsidiary being regulated and supervised by the host country. An additional advantage 
of such an approach would be to help each host country engineer macro-prudential 
supervision in relation which its own credit cycle. The danger, however, is potential financial 
fragmentation, possibly opening the way to financial protectionism.
44 
b.  Correct incentives  
On the top of regulatory loopholes, the pre-crisis period was characterized by regulations that 
did not prevent financial institutions from taking more risk and behaving in a procyclical way 
(or even in some instances that gave them incentives to behave in this way). There are many 
ways to correct the incentives of bankers, most of which have to do with the internal 
organization of banks:  strong risk control departments, clear understanding by the bank’s top 
management of the risks being taken; due diligence on clients’ financial literacy to avoid the 
mis-selling of risky products, etc. It should have been the responsibility of shareholders to 
align the managers’ incentives with their own interests and ensure that the right governance 
arrangements were in place. But the crisis has revealed that shareholders have often been too 
short-sighted to care, implying that supervisors have had to step in. 
In order to correct incentives, three complementary routes have been followed: 
  Capital requirements: in order to reduce the risk of bank failures, the idea is to raise 
capital requirements, to modulate them depending on liquidity mismatch between assets 
and liabilities and to supplement them with limits on total leverage. The problem with 
tighter capital requirements, however, is their cost, since they amount to immobilizing 
capital that could usefully be employed elsewhere in the economy. A way not to waste 
capital would be Kashyap, Rajan and Stein’s (2008) capital insurance proposal. Under 
this scheme, banks would pay an ongoing premium to a ‘capital insurer’ which would 
commit to inject capital into it in the event of a crisis. Candidate capital insurers would be 
long-term investors with a strong capital basis and no regulatory capital requirements, 
                                                 
44   An intermediary solution decided in 2008 was to set up supervisory colleges* to discuss the risk profile 
of large cross-border financial institutions.  59
such as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, or even governments. The advantage of 
this scheme would be to free up capital for productive use, rather than freezing it in banks’ 
accounts. 
  An objection is that too-big-to-fail, systemic financial institutions are already implicitly 
guaranteed by governments without paying an insurance premium. As noted by Alan 
Blinder, the analogy with insurance may not hold because the risk of a financial crisis is 
not diversifiable
45. As for liquidity, the scheme could be to weight regulatory capital not 
only based on risk but also on liquidity, or by setting aside liquidity reserves. The problem 
here is that a liquid market can suddenly dry up, prompting an increase in liquidity 
buffers. Hence liquidity requirements can be procyclical – see Lanoo and Casey (2005) 
for a discussion. 
  Countercyclical buffers: capital requirements force banks to raise capital or to extend less 
credit in troubled times, as already shown in Box 1. To correct this procyclical feature of 
capital requirements, it has been suggested to introduce time-variant capital buffers:  
under such a scheme, banks would be required to increase their regulatory capital or to set 
aside provisions
46 when credit accelerates and to dispose of them when losses have 
materialized, or are about to materialize. A scheme of this sort was put in place by the 
Bank of Spain in the 2000s after the country joined the euro, so as to mitigate the impact 
of the low euro-area interest rates on domestic credit expansion.
47  
  Compensation: performance-based bonuses have been identified as a source of risk-taking 
and pro-cyclical behavior since they have incited bank management to inflate balance 
sheets in bull markets and sometimes to shrink them in bear markets. Accordingly, G-20 
leaders agreed to smooth them over longer time-spans and to introduce claw-back clauses 
(i.e. to cancel part of the bonus in the case of ex-post underperformance), so that 
management bears responsibility for the full gamut of risks. 
c.  Infrastructure and institutions 
The same argument which holds for actors also holds for markets. Contrary to organized 
markets such as stock exchanges, which were tightly regulated to protect against market 
abuse, insider trading, etc., and were required to disclose information on prices and orders, 
over-the-counter markets ( i.e. decentralized markets without a central counterpart or a 
clearing house) were not. At the apex of the crisis, no one could monitor the market for 
corporate  credit-default swaps (CDS)
48, where counter-party risk ( i.e. the risk that the 
counter-party is unable to honour their contracts) could not be evaluated by market actors, 
                                                 
45   “The insurance premium is going to be extremely high, because you’re making people pay in times 
when they don’t want to pay,” quoted in “Capital Ideas,” The Economist, August 28, 2008. 
46   This is called through-the-cycle provisioning* or dynamic provisioning*. 
47    The difference between capital and provisions is that provisions dent operating profits, and are 
therefore more painful for shareholders. 
48   Credit-default swaps (CDS) are financial products that provide insurance against the risk of default of a 
private or public borrower. They are issued and traded by market participants. Lenders can use them to hedge 
against the risk of default of the borrower, and they can also be used for speculative purposes.   60
which resulted in a drying up of the market. Consequently, it was decided at the G-20 
Pittsburgh summit that CDS markets should have a central counterparty to net out positions. 
On the institutional side, the failure of Lehman Brothers was made more dramatic due to the 
difficulty in identifying and compensating the bank’s counterparties, since Lehman Brothers 
was not only ‘too big to fail’, but also ‘too interconnected to fail’. This points to the lack of 
comprehensive schemes to tackle large bankruptcies in the banking sector. Ironically, the 
crisis has spurred mergers and acquisitions that have led to an even larger number of 
systemically important institutions whose activities are spread over numerous countries.  
One way to deal with this issue, proposed by the US Treasury, is to admit that systemic banks 
will always be bailed out by governments, and as the price for this insurance scheme impose 
stricter and more conservative prudential standards on these institutions in terms of capital 
and liquidity ratios and risk-management standards. Another possibility is to force the biggest 
banks to pre-plan their own demise by writing ‘living wills’. This should not only make bank 
resolutions easier and faster, but in the process of planning their own resolutions banks would 
be encouraged to better track their exposure and possibly simplify their legal structure.
49 Like 
supervisory scope, tackling ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions is made difficult by the willingness of 
national governments to attract financial activities and to promote national champions. On the 
top of this, bailouts may involve delicate burden-sharing across countries – a potential source 
of conflict, as exemplified in the case of Icelandic banks in the UK. 
d.  Organize macro-prudential supervision and regulation 
The concept of macro-prudential regulation and supervision dates back to the 1970s and has 
long been championed by the Bank for International Settlements
50, but it has gained steam 
only when the crisis had erupted. In a nutshell, it consists of supplementing monetary policy 
by another instrument that allows the authority in charge to recommend or enforce measures 
that prevent financial instability. The discussion in the 2000s of asset prices and monetary 
policy was, inadvertently, about macro-prudential regulation. The lack of consensus on how 
to implement macro-prudential regulation
51 suggests avoiding a rule-based approach and 
giving discretion to a supervisory authority. This can also be viewed as a learning process. 
This leads us to the who question. There is consensus that macro-prudential oversight should 
involve central banks, because they are technically equipped both for macro-financial and for 
micro-financial analysis, and because they should anyway be prepared to act as lenders of last 
resort when systemic risks materialize. But macro-prudential regulation also requires a bird’s-
eye view of systemic risk in the global financial system – something the EU achieved in 2009 
by creating a European Systemic Risk Board following the De Larosière report, and a role 
which has been taken over by the Federal Reserve in the US. But the feedback from macro-
variables to micro-regulations and standards raises tricky questions. How can a central bank, 
or a related body, enforce regulatory changes in spite of not having competence on regulatory 
                                                 
49   Another proposal would be that, when a financial institution becomes insolvent, the regulator has the 
right to convert its debt into equity, see Snower (2009). 
50   See Borio (2009), “The Macroprudential Approach to Regulation and Supervision”, Vox, April 14, and 
Borio (2003). 
51   See the BIS 79
th Annual Report; Goodhart (2009); and Repullo, Saurina and Trucharte (2009).  61
matters? The vagaries of the Stability and Growth Pact, another macro-based regulatory 
framework, should caution against excessive faith in output gaps and sophisticated through-
the-cycle incentive schemes. 
Finally comes the what for question. Giving central banks a macro-prudential instrument 
implies that they know when to use it, as opposed to using their interest-rate instrument. A 
simple answer is to say that the interest rate should be used to target goods-price inflation and 
the macro-prudential instrument to target asset-price inflation or credit growth. However this 
may lead to situations when a central bank does one thing with the right hand and another 
with the left. If central banks are to be given a second objective and a second instrument, this 
calls for an in-depth reexamination of the pre-existing policy consensus and the elaboration of 
a new policy doctrine. 
While the tasks of central banks have been vastly expanded during the crisis, their 
constitutional mandate and governance model have not been revisited. Even if some of these 
tasks are discontinued when the crisis is over, this raises a dilemma. If the central bank retains 
a purely advisory role, it risks losing its credibility by being held responsible for outcomes 
which in effect it cannot control. Think of housing bubbles:  a central bank responsible for 
financial stability (say, the ECB in its role as chair of the European Systemic Risk Board) 
may urge governments to take regulatory or tax action to cool down the housing market but 
damage its own credibility if they do not comply. But if it is devolved the instruments to 
enforce financial stability, the central bank will have many instruments in its hand and many 
objectives to achieve. In the absence of a clear mission statement, it will soon experience 
conflicts of interest and make mistakes. And it may well be challenged politically as too 
powerful and as in control of instruments whose use requires parliamentary oversight. This 
would be all the more likely because central banks could be, through the setting of cyclical 
capital buffers, at the origin of the need for bank bail-outs. During the crisis itself the 
independence of the Fed started being questioned by Congress. Giving central banks too 
many objectives could eventually result in a loss of independence and hence less capacity to 
achieve price stability.
52 
3.2.  The macroeconomic policy regime 
In the wake of the crisis the macroeconomic focus was on remedial action rather than longer-
term reform. As regards national measures, global summits and other international gatherings 
put emphasis first on stimulus measures and financial regulation, then on exit strategies and 
on resources and governance of international organizations. However, a number of macro- 
issues emerge. 
a.  A new view on rules versus discretion? 
As developed in Section 2, rule-based policy-making was largely put aside during the crisis. 
The EU fiscal policy is a case in point. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was constructed 
on the assumption that the general government deficit in a given country would move up and 
                                                 
52   On macro-prudential supervision and central bank independence, see John Taylor, “Fed needs better 
performance, not powers,» Financial Times, 10 August 2009.  62
down within a limited range along the business cycle, but in 2009-2010 the EU fiscal deficit 
widened by 5% of EU GDP and more than 20 of the 27 EU Member States were considered 
by the European Commission to have an excessive deficit. The SGP includes an escape clause 
for exceptional and temporary circumstances, but it does not set out the principles to be 
applied on such occasions.  
On the one hand, contingent policy rules in case of crisis are difficult to specify because all 
crises are different, and because unexpected shocks and rapidly unfolding events are best 
addressed by discretionary action. On the other hand, letting policy-makers depart too easily 
from rules they have themselves defined undermines the credibility and the very effectiveness 
of these rules. Hence the need for policy rules to include well-formulated escape clauses in 
order to make room for temporary discretion and centralization, but also to be specific on 
which circumstances qualify as extraordinary. 
Escape clauses are no ‘free lunch’:  as illustrated by the experience of fixed exchange-rate 
regimes, to leave open the possibility of departure from the stated rules leads markets to price 
in the corresponding risk – for example through higher risk premiums on government debt. 
But it may be a cost worth paying. Similarly, some countries, most notably Germany, have 
concluded that tighter fiscal rules in normal times are a desirable quid pro quo for flexibility 
in crisis times and have reformed their constitution accordingly. 
b.  International coordination and surveillance 
International coordination may not be confined to prudential issues, since macroeconomic 
factors have also played a role in the crisis. But it took time before G-20 statements started to 
address global imbalances, and they fell short of pronouncements on monetary policies and 
the international monetary system. 
The reason is that governments (i) do not agree on where the responsibility for the crisis lies 
and (ii) are reluctant to commit to abiding by rules that would put constraints on their 
economic policy decisions. As illustrated by the discussion on the ‘global savings glut’ of 
Section 1, global imbalances can be considered the result of either excessively low saving in 
the US or excessively high net saving abroad; or they may result from emerging countries 
willingness to self-insure against future sudden stops in capital inflows by accumulating 
foreign-exchange reserves. In fact, global imbalances are a general equilibrium outcome 
whose policy roots are hard to pin down (see the model of Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa, 2005, 
and Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009, for a discussion). 
At the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009, G-20 leaders established a ‘Framework for 
Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth’ and asked finance ministers and governors to “set 
out objectives, put forward policies to achieve these objectives, and together assess [their] 
progress”. This revival of coordination contrasts with at least twenty years of emphasis on 
independent national policy-making. In the 1990s and the 2000s, exchange-rate surveillance, 
a core mission of the IMF, could not be exercised effectively (Independent Evaluation Office 
of the IMF, 2006). The IMF was neither able to influence US policy nor even to express a 
public view on China’s exchange-rate policy. 
For IMF surveillance to be credible it requires even-handedness, which in turn calls for a 
reform of the Fund’s governance. Currently the US retains veto power on all important  63
decisions (which require a 85% majority) and Europe is globally overrepresented with about a 
third of total voting rights. China, which before the crisis had fewer votes than France, and 
India, which ranked behind Italy, could not accept a stronger IMF say unless this came with a 
major power shift. The Pittsburgh declaration committed members to agreeing on a 
redistribution of power of 5 percent of total voting rights. Even when this is achieved, 
whether or not surveillance can constrain national policies will remain an open issue. The 
European experience is not very encouraging in this respect. 
 
c. Self-insurance or collective insurance? 
One reason why East-Asian countries went into current account surpluses in the 2000s was 
their desire to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves in order to be able to cushion capital- 
flow reversals. Their experience during the crisis of 1997-98 and what they perceived as a 
western bias in IMF decisions led them to insure themselves through reserve accumulation 
instead of relying on IMF support in the event of a balance-of-payments crisis. Such self-
insurance behavior was costly in at least two respects:  the fiscal cost of sterilizing the 
induced rise in domestic liquidity, and the political cost of being accused of currency 
manipulation by trading partners which let their exchange rates float freely. 
Together with IMF governance reform, a series of G-20 decisions – the tripling of IMF 
resources from 250 to 750 billion dollars, the weaker policy conditionality of its programmes 
and the introduction of a new, unconditional Flexible Credit Line (FCL) - were intended to 
address these concerns and relax the constraint of reserve accumulation
53. Post-crisis history 
will tell whether these measures were sufficient or if a universal device for liquidity provision 
should have been sought. As noted by Maurice Obstfeld (2009), the world lacks a global 
lender of last resort:  the IMF would be a natural candidate. 
                                                 
53   The FCL was extended in 2009 to Mexico, Poland and Colombia for a total amount of 77.9 billion 
dollars.  64
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in Section 1, there are still several explanations to the crisis. Even though they 
are not mutually exclusive, they result in different sets of policy recommendations, all of 
which combine the overhaul of financial regulation, supervisory reform, changes in the 
monetary policy framework, and some of which also involve reform of the international 
monetary system and the remit and governance of international organizations. The G-20, 
relying on specialized international bodies such as the IMF and FSB, as well as on national 
and regional authorities, has addressed some of them. Some crucial issues, however, have 
been left unaddressed, both on the regulatory and the macro-financial fronts. 
a.  The remaining regulatory challenge 
Four issues stand out as unresolved challenges: 
  First, moral hazard was magnified by the crisis because of the post-Lehman G-7 decision 
not to let any further financial institution of systemic significance collapse. Large and 
interconnected institutions, as well as their shareholders, know now that they will be 
rescued if threatened with default. This entails a significant danger of excessive risk-
taking – the very same danger the whole apparatus of regulation is intended to avert. 
However, there is no limit to bank size, the failing banks’ creditors have not been 
penalized in the rescue operations and even shareholders have not borne the full brunt of 
their responsibility. This is in striking contrast with the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, 
when private sector ‘involvement’ (sharing the losses) was the name of the game.  
  Second, beyond size, the question of the separation of bank activities between retail and 
investment banking – along the lines of the Glass Steagall Act which regulated US 
banking between 1933 and 1999, or along different lines – has not been much discussed in 
international forums. The question here is whether the utility-like business of providing 
banking services to customers should be better protected against the risk of failure and 
therefore separated from the more risky business of investing and arbitraging. Paul 
Volcker, a former Federal Reserve chairman, has advocated such a direction for reform 
(Volcker, 2009). Implementing it would certainly raise significant difficulties, because the 
business boundaries of the 1930s cannot simply be replicated. But the more fundamental 
question is whether the benefits of having a single interconnected financial system are 
worth the potential costs.
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  Third, the desirable size of the financial sector has barely been discussed. As illustrated by 
its employees’ generous compensation (Philippon and Reshef, 2008), the banking sector 
seems to have succeeded in capturing a rent, which implies that allocating more and more 
resources to this sector could end up being detrimental to overall economic efficiency. 
Furthermore, as illustrated by the Icelandic meltdown, a large financial sector in a small- 
                                                 
54    The US intended distinction between ‘systemically important financial institutions’ and other 
institutions goes some way in this direction but does not address the issue, as systemically important financial 
institutions may be either hedge funds or standard commercial banks.   65
or medium-sized country entails the risk of incurring proportionally very large public- 
finance costs in the event of a bail-out. Lord Turner, the head of the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority, has advocated taxing the financial sector in order to tame its 
development, but no government is seriously considering following his advice. 
  Last but not least, the trade-off between financial stability and the cost of capital has not 
been really addressed. Many of the financial stability measures on the official agenda will 
result in increasing the cost of capital. This is for example the case for compulsory capital 
adequacy ratios:  increasing them is likely to make investment more costly for non-
financial companies, with adverse consequences for capital expenditure and technological 
innovation. The question here is what price society is willing to pay as a counterpart to 
financial stability:  is a more unstable economy acceptable, if it is the condition for faster 
growth? The answer to this fundamental question, which relates to collective preferences, 
is unlikely to be the same across countries. This suggests that regulatory discrepancies are 
here to stay. 
 
b.  Open macro-financial issues 
Turning to the macro-financial dimensions, three items deserve a mention: 
  Stress-testing economic policy. The crisis has been a reminder that economic policy 
involves a strong risk-management dimension. This was understood before the crisis 
by corporations (although risk-management measures were admittedly too crude), but 
hardly at all by governments. Governments do not assess risk properly and they 
seldom disclose margins of error for their own evaluations. More importantly, they do 
not implement the kind of stress-testing financial institutions are required to run, i.e. 
assessments of the robustness of their solvency to extremely unlikely combinations of 
events:  what if the stock market crashes by more than x%, oil prices rise by y%, and 
recovery rates on loans are less than z%? Admittedly, stress- testing is even more 
difficult for a government than it is for a company because it cannot be conceived as a 
partial equilibrium exercise and requires an assessment of the robustness of the whole 
economic and financial complex. However, economic policy-makers should learn 
from robustness assessments such as the one routinely undertaken in complex 
industrial and IT systems. 
  A new framework for monetary policy. By the mid 2000s many countries in the world 
(though not all) were converging on a monetary policy framework that gave a primary 
role to flexible inflation targeting. Even the central banks whose mandate 
encompassed growth (like the Fed) or those which claimed to preserve a role for the 
monetary aggregates (like the ECB) were de facto moving in this direction. The crisis 
has called into question this framework, but no consensus has yet emerged on its 
reform or replacement. 
  What reform of the international monetary system? For those who believe that the 
Chinese current-account surplus and the US deficit played an important role in 
creating the conditions for financial instability, the key question is how to engineer a 
reduction of these imbalances. Beyond the reform of surveillance mentioned in the 
previous section, a discussion has started on the reform of international monetary  66
arrangements.  In March 2009, Chinese central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan called 
for the creation of “an international reserve currency that is disconnected from 
individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the 
inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies”. 
This open challenge to the monopolistic role of the US dollar as an international 
currency – and the resulting lack of incentives to US discipline - was an invitation to 
re-open an international monetary discussion that had been stagnant since the demise 
of the Plaza-Louvre agreements. However the obstacles to redefinition of the global 
rules of the monetary game are even more formidable than those to a strengthening of 
surveillance. The SDR could hardly replace the dollar as the international currency. 
The renminbi will surely play a role at some point in time, but full convertibility is a 
precondition. At any rate, there is currently no challenger to the international role of 
the dollar (Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009; Eichengreen, 2009).  67
REFERENCES 
Acharya, Viral and Matthiew Richardson, eds. (2009), Restoring Financial Stability:  How to 
Repair a Failed System, Wiley, March. 
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2009), “The Shadow Banking System:  Implications for 
Financial Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 382, July.  
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2008), “Liquidity and Leverage,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Staff Reports No. 328, May. 
Bank for International Settlements (2008), 78
th Annual Report. 
Bebchuk, Lucian (2009), Written Testimony Submitted to the Committee on Financial 
Services, US House of Representatives, 11 June.  
Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Decreux, Yvan, Fontagné, Lionel, and David Khoudour-Castéras 
(2009), “Economic crisis and global supply chains,” CEPII working paper No. 2009-15, July. 
Bernanke, Benjamin (2002), “Deflation:  Making Sure ‘IT’ Doesn't Happen Here,” Remarks 
Before the National Economists Club, 21 November, available on the Federal Reserve Board 
website. 
Bernanke, Benjamin (2005), “The global savings glut and the US current account deficit,” 
Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, March 10.  
Bernanke, Benjamin (2009), “The Crisis and the Policy Responses,” At the Stamp Lecture, 
London School of Economics, London, England, 13 January. 
Berndt, Antje and Anurag Gupta (2009), “Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the 
Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit,” unpublished manuscript, available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312. 
Blanchard, Olivier and John Simon (2001), “The long and large decline in US output 
volatility,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 135-164. 
Blanchard, Olivier, Giavazzi, Francesco and Filipa Sa (2005), “International Investors, the US 
Current Account, and the Dollar,» Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2005-1, pp. 1-49. 
Blanchard, Olivier, Cottarelli, Carlo, Spilimbergo, Antonio and Steve Symansky, (2008), 
“Fiscal policy for the crisis,” IMF Staff position note SPN/08/01, December 29. 
Blanchard, Olivier and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2009), “Global Imbalances:  Past, Present, 
and Future,” mimeo, IMF, September.   68
Blanchard, Olivier and Wolfers, Justin (2000), “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the 
Rise of European Unemployment:  The Aggregate Evidence,” Economic Journal, 110, pp 1-
33. 
Blankfein, Lloyd (2009), “Do not destroy the essential catalyst of risk,” The Financial Times, 
8 February.  
Boeri, Tito, Bovenberg, Lans, Coeuré, Benoît and Andrew Roberts (2006), Dealing with the 
New Giants:  Rethinking the Role of Pension Funds, Geneva:  ICMB and CEPR. 
Borio, Claudio (2003), “Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and 
regulation?,» CESifo Economic Studies, vol 49, no 2/2003, pp 181–216. Also available as BIS 
Working Papers, no 128, February. 
Brender, Anton and Florence Pisani (2009), La Crise de la Finance Globalisée, Repères, 
Paris: La Découverte. 
Broda, Christian, Ghezzi, Piero and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati (2009), “The new global balance:  
Financial de-globalisation, savings drain, and the US dollar,” Vox,  May 22. 
Buiter, Willem H. (2007), Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis, CEPR Policy Insight No. 
18 (December), London; Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Caballero, Ricardo, Farhi, Emmanuel and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2008), “An Equilibrium 
Model of Global Imbalances and Low Interest Rates”, American Economic Review, 98 (1), 
pp. 358–393.  
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Arvind Krishnamurthy (2009), “Global imbalances and financial 
fragility”, American Economic Review, 99 (2), 584-88. 
Cerra, Valerie and Sweta Chaman Saxena (2007), “Growth dynamics:  the myth of economic 
recovery,” BIS Working Paper No 226, March.  
Coval, Joshua, Jurek, Jakub and Erik Stafford (2009), “The Economics of Structured 
Finance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 3-25. 
De Larosière, Jacques (2009), Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in 
the EU, February.  
Department of the Treasury (2009), Financial Regulatory Reform:  A New Foundation. 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, June. 
Dooley, Michael P., Folkerts-Landau, David and Peter Garber (2003), “An Essay on the 
Revived Bretton Woods System,” NBER Working Paper, No. 9971.  
Eichengreen, Barry (2009), “The dollar dilemma”, Foreign Affairs, 88 (5), pp. 53-68.  69
Eichengreen, Barry, and Kevin H. O’Rourke (2009), A Tale of Two Depressions, 
www.voxeu.org, June. 
European Commission (2009), “Public Finance in EMU 2009,” provisional issue, June. 
Engel, Charles M. and John H. Rogers (2006), “The US Current Account Deficit and the 
Expected Share of World Output,» Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, pp.  1063–1093.  
Feldstein, Martin (2009), “The case for fiscal stimulus,” Project Syndicate, www.project-
syndicate.org. 
Financial Services Authority (2009), The Turner Review:  A regulatory response to the global 
banking crisis, Financial Services Authority, London, March.   
Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867-1960. Princeton:  Princeton University Press (for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research). 
Goodhart, Charles (2009), “Procyclicality and Financial Regulation,” Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera, No. 16, Banco de España, May. 
Gorton, Gary (2008a), “The Panic of 2007,” Working Paper 14358, Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gorton, Gary (2008b), “The Subprime Panic,” Working Paper 14398, Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Gorton, Gary (2009), “Slapped in the face by the invisible hand:  banking and the panic of 
2007,” paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2009 Financial Markets 
Conference:  Financial Innovation and Crisis, May 11-13. 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Hélène Rey (2007), “From World Banker to World Venture 
Capitalist:  US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege,” in:  Clarida R. (ed.), G7 
Current Account Imbalances:  Sustainability and Adjustment, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, pp.11-66. 
Greenspan, Alan (2004), “The mortgage market and consumer debt,” Remarks at America’s 
Community Bankers Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., 19 October. 
Greenspan, Alan (2005), Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, 16 February.  
Haldane, Andrew G. (2009), “Rethinking the financial network,” speech at the Financial 
Student Association, Amsterdam, 28 April.  
Hellwig, Martin (2008), “The Causes of the Financial Crisis,” CESifo Forum 4/2008, pp. 12-
21.   70
Hildebrand, Philipp (2008), “Is Basel II Enough? The Benefits of a Leverage Ratio,” 
Financial Markets Group Lecture, London School of Economics, 15 December. 
Holmström, Bengt (2008), “Discussion of ‘The Panic of 2007’ by Gary Gorton,» in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System.  
Hoshi, Takeo and Anil K. Kashyap (2008), “Will the US bank recapitalization succeed? 
Lessons from Japan,” Working Paper No. 14401, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2006), Evaluation of IMF Multilateral 
Surveillance, IEO Report.  
International Monetary Fund (2008), Global Financial Stability Report, October.  
International Monetary Fund (2009a), Global Financial Stability Report, April.  
International Monetary Fund (2009b), “Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and 
Financial Crisis,” Staff Position Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department, SPN/09/13, June 9. 
Kashyap, Anil K., Rajan, Raghuram G. and Jeremy C. Stein (2008), “Rethinking capital 
regulation,” Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium on 
“Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System,» Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 21-23 
August. 
King, Mervyn (2009), Speech at the CBI Dinner, Nottingham, 20 January.  
Kroszner, Randall (2009), “Central banks must time a ‘good exit’,” The Financial Times, 
August 11.  
Krugman, Paul R. (1998a), “Will Asia Bounce Back?” March, http://web.mit/krugman/www/ 
Krugman, Paul R. (1998b), “The Confidence Game:  How Washington Worsened Asia’s 
Crash,” The New Republic, October 5. 
Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia (2008), “Systemic Banking Crises:  A New Database,» IMF 
Working Paper No 08/224, November.  
Lannoo, Karel and Jean-Pierre Casey (2005), “Capital Adequacy vs. Liquidity Requirements 
in Banking Supervision in the EU”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 84, October. 
Mandeville, Bernard (1714 [1989]), The Fable of the Bees:    Or Private Vices, Publick 
Benefits, Penguin Classics. 
Megginson, William and Jeffry Netter (2001), “From State To Market: A Survey Of 
Empirical Studies On Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp 321-
389.  71
Meier, André (2009), “Panacea, curse or nonevent? Unconventional monetary policy in the 
United Kingdom,” IMF working paper 09/163, August. 
Mendoza, Enrique G., Quadrini, Vincenzo and Jose-Victor Ríos Rull (2008), “Financial 
Integration, Financial Development and Global Imbalances,” mimeo, July. 
Obama, Barack (2009), Address at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, January 8. 
Obstfeld, Maurice (2009), “Lenders of Last Resort in A Globalized World,” University of 
California, Berkeley, mimeo, June.  
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff, K. (2005), “The Unsustainable US Current Account 
Position Revisited,” Brookings papers on Economic Activity No , pp.  
Orphanides, Athanasios (2004), “Monetary policy in deflation: the liquidity trap in history 
and practice,” Finance and Economic Discussion Series, 2004-01, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.  
Panetta, Fabio, Faeh, Thomas, Grande, Giuseppe, Ho, Corinne, King, Michael, Levy, Aviram, 
Signoretti, Federico M., Taboga, Marco and Andrea Zaghini (2009), “An assessment of 
financial sector rescue programmes,” BIS Papers No. 48, Basel:  Bank for International 
Settlements.  
Panetta, Fabio and Paolo Angelini eds., (2009), “Financial Pro-cyclicality:  Lessons from the 
Crisis,” Questioni di Economia e Finanza No 44, Banca d’Italia, April.  
Persaud, A. (2009), “Macro-prudential regulation: fixing fundamental market (and regulatory) 
failures,” paper prepared for the Bruegel-Cepii-Icrier conference on International 
Cooperation in Times of Global Crisis: Views from G20 Countries, New Delhi, 14-15 
September. 
Philippon, Thomas and Ariell Reshef (2008), “Wages and Human Capital in the US Financial 
Industry:  1909-2006,” mimeo, December.  
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Bruno Van Pottelsberghe (2009), “Handle with care:  post-crisis 
growth in the EU,” Bruegel Policy Brief No 2009/02, April.  
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Adam Posen (2009), The euro at Ten:  The Next Global Currency?, 
Bruegel/Peterson Institute for International Economics.   
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009a), “The aftermaths of financial crises,” 
American Economic Review, May. 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009b), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries 
of Financial Folly”, Princeton University Press. 
Repullo, Rafael, and Javier Suarez (2008), “The Procyclical Effects of Basel II,” CEPR 
Discussion Paper, No. 6862, June.   72
Repullo, Rafael, Saurina, Jesús and Carlos Trucharte (2009), “Mitigating the procyclicality of 
Basel II,” CEMFI Working Paper No. 0903. 
Romer, Cristina (1999), “Change in business cycles: evidence and explanations”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23-44. 
Rodrik, Dani (2006), “The social cost of foreign exchange reserves,” Inernational Economic 
Journal, 20 (3), 253-266. 
Smith, Adam (1776 [1977]), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
University Of Chicago Press. 
Snower, Dennis (2009), "The impact of the global financial crisis on Europe and Europe's  
responses,” AAEF conference, Kiel, July 7-8. 
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas (2007), The Black Swan:  The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 
Random House, New York.  
Taylor, John (2008), Getting Off Track:  How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, 
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, March. 
Volcker, Paul A. (2009),  Statement before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
US House of Representatives, 24 September. 
Von Hagen, Jürgen (2009), “The monetary mechanics of the crisis,” Bruegel policy 
contribution No. 2009/08, August. 